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Abstract
Many logical theories are incomplete, in the sense that non-trivial conclu-
sions about particular situations cannot be derived from them using classical
deduction. In this paper, we show how the ideas of interpolation and extrap-
olation, which are of crucial importance in many numerical domains, can be
applied in symbolic settings to alleviate this issue in the case of propositional
categorization rules. Our method is based on (mainly) qualitative descrip-
tions of how different properties are conceptually related, where we identify
conceptual relations between properties with spatial relations between re-
gions in Ga¨rdenfors conceptual spaces. The approach is centered around the
view that categorization rules can often be seen as approximations of linear
(or at least monotonic) mappings between conceptual spaces. We use this
assumption to justify that whenever the antecedents of a number of rules
stand in a relationship that is invariant under linear (or monotonic) transfor-
mations, their consequents should also stand in that relationship. A form of
interpolative and extrapolative reasoning can then be obtained by applying
this idea to the relations of betweenness and parallelism respectively. After
discussing these ideas at the semantic level, we introduce a number of in-
ference rules to characterize interpolative and extrapolative reasoning at the
syntactic level, and show their soundness and completeness w.r.t. the pro-
posed semantics. Finally, we show that the considered inference problems
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are PSPACE-hard in general, while implementations in polynomial time are
possible under some relatively mild assumptions.
Keywords: Commonsense reasoning, Conceptual spaces, Interpolative
reasoning, Analogical reasoning
1. Introduction
Symbolic approaches to knowledge representation typically start from a
finite set of natural language labels, which are associated to atomic propo-
sitions (in propositional settings), to predicates (in first-order settings), or
to atomic concepts (in description logics). The meaning of these labels is
then expressed implicitly by encoding how the corresponding propositions
are related to each other using a logical theory. Clearly, such a logical the-
ory can only capture a small fraction of the actual meaning of the labels at
the cognitive level. Formalizing commonsense reasoning then boils down to
developing principled approaches to extend or refine logical inference, such
that the conclusions that can be derived from a logical theory become, in
some way, closer to what we infer at the cognitive level. Some approaches to
non-monotonic reasoning [1], for instance, deal with exceptions by assuming
that rules only apply to typical instances of the concepts involved or are only
valid in normal situations, even though these notions of typicality and nor-
mality are not explicitly expressed at the symbolic level. Essentially, such
approaches are non-monotonic because the factual knowledge they work on is
incomplete: we may know that Tweety is a bird, but not that it is a penguin.
Later observations may enrich our factual knowledge base, necessitating a re-
vision of some of the assumptions that were made (e.g. Tweety can fly). As
another form of commonsense reasoning, in this paper we look at techniques
for dealing with a lack of generic knowledge. For the ease of presentation,
we will assume that generic knowledge is expressed as a set of propositional
rules. We are then interested in situations where factual knowlege is, in prin-
ciple, complete, but where none of the given rules applies to the situation at
hand. For instance, we may know that it is advisable to rest (i) when feeling
nauseated and having a high fever, and (ii) when feeling nauseated without
any fever, but not have any information about what is advisable in case of
nausea with a mild fever.
Similarity-based reasoning. Humans can often cope with such a lack of knowl-
edge by drawing analogies, or by resorting to knowledge about similar situa-
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tions [2, 3]. This observation has led to a number of theories of approximate
reasoning, which are mainly based on the premise that from similar con-
ditions we can draw similar conclusions. Most notably, a large number of
fuzzy set based approaches have been proposed that build on the idea that
the more a situation is compatible with the fuzzy labels in the antecedent
of a rule, the more it should be compatible with the fuzzy labels in its con-
sequent. Such rules, called gradual rules in [4], are based on a measure of
similarity that is implicit in the definition of the membership functions of the
fuzzy labels. Related to gradual rules, certainty rules [4] rather encode that
the more similar a situation is to the fuzzy labels in the antecedent of a rule,
the more certain that the consequent holds. Some related approaches avoid
the use of fuzzy sets and rather encode similarity assessments in an explicit
way (e.g. [5, 6, 7]). Given that a1 and a → b hold, such methods allow to
derive b with a certainty that depends on the degree of similarity sim(a, a1).
Despite the intuitive appeal of similarity-based approaches, and their pop-
ularity in the context of control and classification problems, they face a num-
ber of difficulties when used for commonsense reasoning. First, quantitative
similarity degrees can be hard to obtain in practice, a problem which is aggra-
vated by the observation that similarity judgements are context-dependent
[8, 9]. The quantitative nature of similarity degrees also makes it difficult to
encode rules, e.g. exactly how similar should a given premise a1 be to the
antecedent of the rule a→ b to derive b with a given certainty? Finally, sim-
ilarity based methods tend to lack a principled way of dealing with conjunc-
tions. For instance, assume that the rule a∧b→ c and the facts a1 and b1 are
known to hold, and moreover sim(a, a1) = 0.6 and sim(b, b1) = 0.4. To assess
whether we can plausibly derive a1∧b1 → c using similarity based reasoning,
we would need to assess to what extent a1 ∧ b1 is similar to a ∧ b. Usually,
a truth-functional approach is assumed, assuming e.g. sim(a ∧ b, a1 ∧ b1) =
min(sim(a, a1), sim(b, b1)) or sim(a∧ b, a1 ∧ b1) = sim(a, a1) · sim(b, b1). Such
views, however, are hard to justify from a cognitive point of view.
Betweenness. The aforementioned shortcomings of similarity-based reason-
ing seem closely related to the use of degrees. A key observation is that in
practice, similarity-based approaches are often used to implement a form of
interpolation of symbolic rules: given the rules a1 → b1 and a3 → b3, and a
premise a2 which is known to be between a1 and a3, a conclusion is obtained
between b1 and b3. Interpolative inference, however, can also be implemented
in a qualitative way, taking betweenness as primitive rather than similarity.
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Indeed, it suffices to know which propositions are conceptually between a1
and a3 and which propositions are between b1 and b3. For instance, since
a mild fever is conceptually between high fever and no fever, in the earlier
example we conclude that resting is advised in case of nausea with a mild
fever. This basic form of interpolative inference can then be further refined,
depending on the kind of background information that is available about the
conceptual relationships between the propositions (labels). For example, if
we know that a2 is closer to a1 than to a3, we may insist that the conclusion
should also be closer to b1 than to b3. The idea of interpolating symbolic
knowledge can also be extended to various forms of extrapolative inference,
as is illustrated in the following example.
Example 1. Consider the following knowledge base, containing observations
about the comfort level of different housing options:
mansion→ exclusive (1)
villa ∧ suburbs→ luxurious (2)
apartment ∧ suburbs→ basic (3)
apartment ∧ centre→ very-comfortable (4)
Clearly, this knowledge base is incomplete. For instance, we have no infor-
mation at all about the comfort level of a villa in the centre. However, from
the rules that are provided, it seems reasonable to assume that villas are more
comfortable than apartments (by comparing (2) and (3)) and that housing in
the centre is more comfortable than housing in the suburbs (by comparing (3)
and (4)). As a form of extrapolative inference, this leads us to conclude that
a villa in the centre would at least be as comfortable as a villa in the suburbs,
i.e. either luxurious or exclusive. We may also wonder about apartments in
the outskirts of the city. As living in the outskirts is conceptually between
living in the centre and living in the suburbs, from (3) and (4) we may rea-
sonably assume, as a form of interpolative inference, that the comfort level of
an apartment in the outskirts would be between basic and very-comfortable.
Objectives of the paper. The aim of this paper is to develop a principled
approach to interpolative and extrapolative reasoning, as a general way to
avoid the use of degrees when dealing with incomplete generic knowledge. In
particular, we address the following research questions:
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1. How can interpolative and extrapolative inference be formalized? What
are its computational properties and how can automated inference pro-
cedures be implemented?
2. What is the nature of the background knowledge that is needed to
support interpolative and extrapolative reasoning?
3. What is the semantic justification for interpolation and extrapolation?
While most approaches to non-monotonic reasoning have a principled
semantic foundation, typically based on the notion of preferred worlds
[10, 1] or the idea of stable models [11, 12], this is to a much lesser
extent the case for current methods that deal with incompleteness of
rule bases.
The underlying idea is that among all possible refinements of a given
knowledge base we favour those which are most regular, an intuition which
will be formalized using the theory of conceptual spaces [13]. This theory
posits that natural language labels can be identified with a convex region
in a particular geometric space — called a conceptual space — whose di-
mensions correspond to cognitively meaningful qualities. Using conceptual
spaces, notions such as betweenness can be given a clear geometric inter-
pretation, which allows us to derive a semantic characterization of various
interpolative and extrapolative inference relations. It is important to note,
however, that although conceptual spaces are crucial to justify our approach,
in practical applications, we do not actually require that the conceptual space
representations of properties are available. In particular, the inference mech-
anism itself will only require qualitative knowledge about how the conceptual
representations of labels are spatially related. For instance, to support a ba-
sic interpolative inference relation, it is only required that we know which
labels are conceptually between which other labels. Furthermore note that
this form of commonsense reasoning will actually be monotonic: increasing
the rule base may allow us to refine earlier conclusions, but will never violate
them. In contrast, in the setting of non-monotonic reasoning, increasing the
factual knowledge may lead us to consider different rules to be applicable, as
more specific rules may override more general ones.
Depending on the considered application, the required qualitative knowl-
edge can be provided by an expert or it can be derived automatically using
data-driven techniques. In the first case, an expert may choose to manually
encode some rules, and rely on interpolation or extrapolation to avoid the
need for a complete specification of the considered domain (e.g. explicitly
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enumerating the comfort level for all housing types and all location types).
The resulting inference relation would be guaranteed to provide sound con-
clusions, although for those parts of the domain that were not explicitly
modeled by the expert, available information may be less precise (but not
trivial). In the second case, where data-driven techniques are used to obtain
background information about the conceptual relationship of different labels
(e.g. by analysing documents from the web), the aim is rather to generate
plausible conclusions from imperfect conceptual background knowledge. In
this way, we can combine the rigour of a logic-based framework with the
flexibility of data-driven methods. The commonsense aspect of the approach
thus lies in the possibility to go beyond classical deduction by taking ad-
vantage of structural domain knowledge that has been induced from data,
without resorting to purely statistical techniques as in [14].
Organization. The paper is structured as follows. After discussing related
work in Section 2, we present a high-level overview of our approach in Sec-
tion 3. Section 4 subsequently discusses in more detail how qualitative spatial
descriptions of conceptual spaces can be used to encode the conceptual re-
lationship of different atomic properties. Next, in Section 5 we investigate
how conceptual relations between atomic properties can be leveraged to con-
ceptual relations between unions and intersections of properties (represented
as sets of vectors of properties), and how the latter conceptual relations can
be used to refine a given rule base at the semantic level. In Section 6 we
then focus on the syntactic level: we introduce a set of inference rules and
show that they are sound and complete w.r.t. the semantics from Section
5. Section 7 analyzes the computational complexity of interpolative and ex-
trapolative reasoning and presents an implementation method. In Section 8
we present some further thoughts on how to apply our method in practice,
and in particular on the question of how to handle inconsistencies that are
introduced by our method. We present our conclusions and a number of
directions for future work in Section 9. Finally, note that this paper forms
a substantially extended and revised version of [15]. Among others, we now
provide a complete characterization of extrapolative inference and include
the idea of comparative distance (whereas only the interpolative inference
relation was characterized in [15]). We moreover present an implementation
method, as well as the proofs.
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2. Related work
Our work is clearly related to existing approaches in cognition and knowl-
edge representation that are based on a spatial representation of knowledge.
However, our approach also touches upon several other domains, including
non-monotonic reasoning, similarity-based reasoning, regularization in ma-
chine learning, and qualitative physics. We briefly clarify the relationship
with each of these domains.
Spatial representations of meaning
One of the central motivations of this paper is to approach commonsense
reasoning by abandoning the idea that atomic propositions are independent
from each other, in favour of a view which allows them to be conceptually
related in a way that cannot be fully expressed at the logical level. Although
atomic propositions are traditionally assumed to be independent, several
20th century philosophers have argued against such a view. Wittgenstein
[16] was among the first to realize that sometimes we need more than a
purely syntactic approach to logic, considering that atomic logical formulas
may exclude each other while they are not contradictory. A statement such
as place P is green at time T and place P it is blue at time T is treated
as nonsensical by Wittgenstein rather than false, where he writes “It is, of
course, a deficiency of our notation that it does not prevent the formation of
such nonsensical constructions, and a perfect notation will have to exclude
such structures by definite rules of syntax” [16]. In the same spirit, Carnap
[17] uses the notion of an attribute space to group predicates of the same
type. An attribute space is an abstract representation of a certain domain.
For instance, the attribute space of colours consists of all (infinitely many)
colour instances. In practice, these attribute spaces are usually described
using a finite set of labels, which correspond to predicates at the logical level.
By thus partitioning the predicates into separate attribute spaces, one can
restrict interpretations to those that make exactly one predicate true from
each attribute space, for any given individual. Quine [18] uses the related
notion of a quality space to characterize similarity, putting forward the view
that similarity cannot be defined in logical terms, and thus requires a deeper
representation of atomic propositions. These works have led to the more
recent development of conceptual spaces [13] by Ga¨rdenfors, in an attempt
to use the idea of a spatial representation of meaning to tackle problems in
artificial intelligence (AI), among others. Conceptual spaces will be discussed
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in more detail in Section 4.
Apart from the work on conceptual spaces, the idea of assuming a spa-
tial representation to reason about concepts also underlies [19], where an
approach to integrate heterogeneous databases is proposed based on spa-
tial relations between concepts. This approach starts from the observation
that types from one database may not have an exact counterpart in another
database. Conceptual relations between types are therefore considered which
express e.g. that all typical instances of type A belong to type B but some
instances of type A may be outside B. Such relations can formally be mod-
elled as egg/yolk relations, which are a form of qualitative spatial relations
between ill-defined spatial regions. Somewhat related, in [20] we presented a
general method for merging conflicting propositional knowledge bases com-
ing from different sources, based on the view that different sources may have
a slightly different understanding of a given label. The different ways in
which such a label may be understood are encoded in terms of four primitive
relations that essentially correspond to qualitative spatial relations between
(unknown) geometric representations of the labels. Although the kind of
spatial relations encountered in these existing works are mainly mereotopo-
logical, qualitative spatial reasoning about betweenness is an active topic of
research [21, 22].
Nonmonotonic reasoning
In general, several facets of commonsense reasoning have been exten-
sively studied within the field of AI. Of particular interest is the work on
System P for reasoning about rules with exceptions [1]. In this approach,
a non-monotonic consequence relation is defined by encoding axiomatically
how new rules may be derived from existing rules. In particular, the non-
monotonic consequence relation |∼ is defined by the following inference rules:
Reflexivity α |∼ α
Left logical equivalence If α ≡ α′ and α |∼ β then α′ |∼ β
Right weakening If β |= β′ and α |∼ β then α |∼ β′
OR If α |∼ γ and β |∼ γ then α ∨ β |∼ γ
Cautious monotony If α |∼ β and α |∼ γ then α ∧ β |∼ γ
Cut If α ∧ β |∼ γ and α |∼ β then α |∼ γ
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where ≡ and |= denote equivalence and entailment in classical logic, respec-
tively. Intuitively, α |∼ β means that in normal situations where α holds, it is
also the case that β holds. The normative approach by System P about how a
non-monotonic consequence relation should behave has been very influential
in the field of non-monotonic reasoning. While the purpose of our paper is not
to study non-monotonic consequence relations, our approach does resemble
System P in that our goal is also to produce new rules, which are appropriate
to a given situation. However, whereas System P is concerned with finding
the most specific rules that are compatible with our (incomplete) knowledge
about the situation at hand, in interpolative and extrapolative reasoning
there is no genuine issue of incompleteness at the factual level. Rather, we
are interested in situations where the given situation is not explicitly covered
by a rule base, but is intermediate between, or analogous to situations that
are covered.
Similarity-based reasoning
Somewhat related, several authors have studied similarity-based conse-
quence relations which are based on the intuition that α approximately en-
tails β iff every model of α is similar to some model of β [23, 6, 24]. In [25],
for instance, a similarity-based consequence relation is contrasted with the
consequence relation from System P, revealing that similarity-based reason-
ing satisfies monotonicity and most of the axioms of System P, but not the
cut rule. More generally, a large number of authors have proposed systems
for approximate, similarity-based reasoning within the field of fuzzy set the-
ory. Most of these works are based on Zadeh’s generalized modus ponens
[26] (but see [27] for an early example of a more qualitative approach), which
allows us to derive a fuzzy restriction on the value of variable Y from the
knowledge that if X is A then Y is B and X is A′ with A, A′ and B fuzzy
sets. The basic idea is that the more A is similar to A′, the more the in-
ferred restriction on Y will be close to B. When this idea is applied to a
set of parallel rules, such that the fuzzy sets in the antecedents of the rules
overlap, it leads to a form of interpolative reasoning. Furthermore, several
authors have proposed methods to interpolate fuzzy rule bases in general,
i.e. without requiring overlap of the fuzzy sets; we refer to [28] for a re-
cent overview. While these techniques are also about interpolating rules,
they differ from our approach in a number of ways. First, they are mostly
restricted to unidimensional, numerical domains, and they require that quan-
titative representations of symbolic labels be available in the form of fuzzy
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sets. Furthermore, they treat logical connectives, such as conjunctions in the
antecedent, in a truth-functional (and therefore heuristic) way.
In [29], a logic called CSL is introduced which has a construct A ⇔ B
denoting all objects that are more similar to instances of concept A than to
instances of concept B. The qualitative nature of this logic brings it closer to
the approach we present in this paper. As it is based exclusively on closeness,
and not on other aspects of spatial localization such as being in between, CSL
is not directly suitable as a basis for interpolative or extrapolative reasoning.
Interestingly, however, as a result of this restriction, CSL can be described
using a preferential semantics [30].
Regularity
In the propositional setting, the idea of interpolation and extrapolation
has been studied in [31], but from a rather different angle. In particular, the
paper discusses how the belief that certain propositions hold at certain mo-
ments in time can be extended to beliefs about other moments in time, using
persistence assumptions as a starting point. Nonetheless, as in our paper,
the main idea is to use general meta-principles to find those completion(s) of
a knowledge base that are most regular in some sense.
The idea of regularity can also be found in work on analogical proportions.
An analogical proportion is an expression of the form a : b :: c : d which reads
as a is to b as c is to d. If a, b, c and d are binary propositions, this can
be formalized as (a → b ≡ c → d) ∧ (b → a ≡ d → c) (see [32]). In
[33], an approach to classification is outlined which uses the view that, as
a form of regularity, the more of the condition attributes of three training
items form an analogical proportion with the condition attributes of the item
to be classified, the more it becomes likely that also the decision attribute
should form an analogical proportion. Using connectives from multi-valued
logic, analogical proportions can be defined for graded propositions, which
allows us to extend this idea to numerical attributes. In [34], an extrapolative
inference mechanism has been proposed which is based on such analogical
proportions between graded proportions. The latter technique can be seen
as a special case of the approach we develop in this paper. In this paper,
however, we also consider forms of interpolative and extrapolative reasoning
that are not based on analogical proportions, and the proposed techniques
are moreover not restricted to linearly ordered domains.
More generally, the idea of regularity appears in various forms in learning
settings. In graph regularization [35], for instance, the desire for regularity
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is even made explicit in the form of a graph which connects instances that
should receive a similar classification. In other approaches, the idea of regu-
larity is implicit in the choice of the underlying classification functions that
are allowed (e.g. being restricted to hyperplanes in the case of support vector
machines), and is thus imposed to avoid overfitting. As an example of an-
other domain where the idea of regularity surfaces, [36] presents an approach
to derive a preference ordering, starting from a set of generic preferences.
To choose a specific ordering among all those satisfying the constraints, the
principle of minimal specificity from possibility theory is adopted as a way
to avoid introducing any irregularities that have not been explicitly specified
as constraints.
The notion of matrix abduction, proposed in [37] is also related to our
work in its use of regularity as a criterion to complete missing values, although
it operates at a lower-level representation. Specifically, consider a matrix
whose rows correspond to objects and whose columns correspond to binary
features, such that exactly one entry of the matrix is ‘?’, corresponding to
a missing value, and all the other entries are 0 or 1. Then [37] proposes to
choose the missing value such that the regularity of the matrix is maximized.
Specifically, a partial order relation is induced from both of the possible
completions of the matrix, and the completion which is favoured is the one
whose associated partial order relation is most natural in some sense. Note
that, somewhat related, in abductive reasoning for causal diagnosis, it is
also common to favour the simplest explanations (e.g. preferring single fault
diagnoses to explain observed symptoms).
Qualitative physics
Finally, there is some resemblance between the inference procedure pre-
sented in this paper and the early work on qualitative reasoning about physi-
cal systems [38, 39], which deals with monotonicity constraints such as “if the
value of x increases, then (all things being equal) the value of y decreases”.
Our inference procedure differs from these approaches as the domains we rea-
son about do not need to be linearly ordered. Moreover, in the special case
of linearly ordered domains, we assume no prior information about which
partial mappings are increasing and which are decreasing.
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3. Overview of the approach
In this section, we introduce some notations and basic concepts that will
be used throughout the paper. We also present the main intuitions of our
approach at an informal level.
Let A1, ..., An be finite sets of labels, where each set Ai corresponds to
a certain type of properties1 (e.g. colors), and the labels of Ai correspond
to particular properties of the corresponding type (e.g. red, green, orange).
The labels in Ai are assumed to correspond to jointly exhaustive and pair-
wise disjoint (JEPD) properties. Note that each element (a1, ..., an) from
the Cartesian product A = A1 × ... × An then corresponds to a maximally
descriptive specification of the properties that some object or situation may
satisfy. We furthermore assume that Ai ∩ Aj = ∅ for i 6= j. We will refer
to the sets Ai as attribute domains, and to their elements as attributes or,
when used in a propositional language, as atoms.
We consider propositional rules of the form β → γ, where β and γ are
propositional formulas, built in the usual way from the set of atoms A1 ∪
...∪An and the connectives ∧ and ∨. Note that we do not need to explicitly
consider negation, as the negation of an atom a ∈ Ai corresponds to the
disjunction of the atoms in Ai \ {a}. We say that an element (a1, ..., an) ∈
A is a model of a formula (or a rule) α, written (a1, ..., an) |=A α if the
corresponding propositional interpretation {a1, ..., an} is a model of α in the
usual sense, where we see propositional interpretations as sets containing all
atoms that are interpreted as true. For formulas (or rules or sets of rules)
α1 and α2, we say that α1 entails α2, written α1 |=A α2 if for every ω ∈ A,
ω |=A α1 implies ω |=A α2. Note that the notion of entailment we consider
is classical entailment, modulo the assumption that the propositions in each
set Ai are JEPD.
Example 2. Consider the following attribute domains:
A1 = {row-house1, semi-detached1, bungalow, villa,mansion, bedsit, studio,
one-bed-ap, two-bed-ap, three-bed-ap, loft, penthouse}
A2 = {row-house2, semi-detached2, detached, apartment}
A3 = {very-small, small,medium, large, very-large}
A4 = {basic, comfortable, very-comfortable, luxurious, exclusive}
1Throughout this paper, we use the terms concept and property interchangeably.
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where A1 lists the housing types that are possible in the given context, A2
provides a coarser description of some of these housing types, and A3 and A4
contain the labels that are used to describe housing sizes and comfort levels
respectively. Note that subscripts are used for the housing options row-house
and semi-detached to ensure that different attribute domains are disjoint.
When there is no cause for confusion, we will omit these subscripts. The
following set of rules R provides a partial specification of how these attribute
domains are related to each other:
bungalow→ medium bungalow→ detached (5)
mansion→ very-large mansion→ detached (6)
large ∧ detached→ lux large ∧ row-house→ comf (7)
small ∧ detached→ bas ∨ comf mansion→ excl (8)
where some labels are abbreviated for the ease of presentation. For example
(villa, detached, large, lux) is a model of each of these rules.Note that the only
conclusions that can be derived from R are more or less trivial, e.g.
R |=Avilla→ very-small ∨ small ∨medium ∨ large ∨ very-large (9)
R |=A(small ∨ large) ∧ detached→ basic ∨ comfortable ∨ luxurious (10)
Note that (9) follows from our assumption that the labels in an attribute
domain are exhaustive.
3.1. Commonsense inference
A rule base R over the atoms in A usually only provides an incomplete
specification of how the given attribute domains are related to each other.
We are interested in refining the available knowledge in R using a number
of generic meta-principles. To this end, we will make use of background
knowledge about the conceptual relationship of different formulas, which we
assume to be encoded in a set of assertions Σ (to be formalized in Section 6).
We are then interested in defining a consequence relation ⊢ that extends the
entailment relation |=A (i.e. supraclassicality). Specifically, we assume that
the following inference rule is valid:
R |=A β → γ
(R,Σ) ⊢ β → γ
(S)
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The first meta-principle we consider is that intermediate conditions should
lead to intermediate conclusions.
For instance, given that both large and small detached houses have a
comfort level that is between basic and luxurious, we derive that also medium
detached houses should have a comfort level between these bounds. More
generally, if a propositional formula β is conceptually between the formulas β1
and β2, the idea of interpolative inference is that whatever we can derive from
β should be conceptually between what we can derive from β1 and what we
can derive from β2. The exact nature of this conceptual betweenness will be
formalized in the following sections, but intuitively β is conceptually between
β1 and β2 if β has all the features that β1 and β2 have in common. We could
say, for instance, that a bistro is conceptually between a bar and a restaurant,
or that a studio is conceptually between a bedsit and an apartment. In
ecology, we may consider that taiga is between tundra and temperate-forest.
We could take the view that the painting style of Renoir is conceptually
between the painting styles of Monet and Manet.
To encode information about betweenness at the syntactic level, we use a
modality⋊⋉, i.e. the formula β1 ⋊⋉β2 is true whenever a situation holds which
is conceptually between a situation satisfying β1 and a situation satisfying β2
(or alternatively, when talking about concepts, β1 ⋊⋉β2 is true for instances
that are between β1 and β2). Typically, it will not be possible to have a
precise definition of β1 ⋊⋉β2, as, in fact, our logical language may not be rich
enough to precisely capture exactly those situations. However, in practice,
we may obtain knowledge about upper and lower approximations of β1 ⋊⋉β2.
We write Σ ⊢ γ → β1 ⋊⋉ β2 to denote that everything which satisfies γ
is conceptually between β1 and β2, and Σ ⊢ β1 ⋊⋉ β2 → γ to denote that
anything which is conceptually between β1 and β2 should definitely satisfy
γ.
Example 3. It is not the case that all lofts are conceptually between a three-
bedroom apartment and a penthouse (e.g. a small loft with only one bedroom),
so loft → three-bed-ap ⋊⋉ penthouse does not hold. However, we do have
trivially that
three-bed-ap ∨ penthouse→ three-bed-ap⋊⋉penthouse
Conversely, however, some lofts are between a three-bedroom apartment and
a penthouse, so we cannot remove the disjunct loft in the consequent of the
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following implication
three-bed-ap⋊⋉penthouse→ three-bed-ap ∨ loft ∨ penthouse
Note that in the considered domain, there are no apartments with more than
three bedrooms (with the possible exception of penthouses), hence three-bed-ap,
loft and penthouse exhaustively cover all situations that are between a three-
bedroom apartment and a penthouse.
On the other hand, we may consider that all studios are between bedsits
and one-bedroom apartments. Under this view, we should be able to derive
the following rules from Σ:
bedsit ∨ studio ∨ one-bed-ap→ bedsit⋊⋉one-bed-ap
bedsit⋊⋉one-bed-ap→ bedsit ∨ studio ∨ one-bed-ap
Using the binary modality⋊⋉, we can define the following interpolative infer-
ence rule:
(R,Σ) ⊢ β1 → γ1
(R,Σ) ⊢ β2 → γ2
Σ ⊢ β∗ → β1 ⋊⋉β2
Σ ⊢ γ1 ⋊⋉γ2 → γ
∗
(R,Σ) ⊢ β∗ → γ∗
(I)
A diagrammatic representation of this interpolation principle is shown in
Figure 1(a): given two rules β1 → γ1 and β2 → γ2, we derive a rule which
applies to a situation β∗ which is intermediate between β1 and β2. The
conclusion γ∗ of that rule is required to exhaustively cover all situations that
are intermediate between γ1 and γ2.
The second meta-principle states that analogous changes in the condition
of a rule should lead to analogous changes in the conclusion.
Let us write 〈β1, β2〉 to denote the change that is needed to convert a
specification compatible with β1 into a specification compatible with β2.
The intuition will be that 〈β1, β2〉 determines a direction-of-change. In con-
trast to betweenness, this notion of direction is not symmetric, e.g. while
〈two-bed-ap, three-bed-ap〉 denotes the direction of an increasing number of
bedrooms, 〈three-bed-ap, two-bed-ap〉 denotes a decreasing number. Given
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(a) Interpolative inference (b) Extrapolative inference
Figure 1: Modelling betweenness and parallelism between regions.
a third formula β3, we are then interested in those situations that can be
obtained by changing a situation compatible with β3 in the direction spec-
ified by 〈β1, β2〉. In particular, we will write β3 ⊲ 〈β1, β2〉 for the formula
that covers all such situations. For example, we could consider that pro-
gressive rock differs from hard rock by having less standard song structures
and arrangements, while keeping the same instruments. Then heavy-metal⊲
〈hard-rock, prog-rock〉 would cover all music genres that use heavy metal in-
struments and timbres, but less standard song structures and arrangements.
This would include all progressive metal, as well as some instances of avant-
garde metal, among others. In biology, we may consider that the difference
between dog to coyote is analogous to the difference between cat and leop-
ard, or to the difference between cat and lynx, which we could encode as
coyote→ dog⊲〈cat, leopard〉 and coyote→ dog⊲〈cat, lynx〉 respectively. Note
in particular that we do not take into account the amount of change: while we
may consider that the change from cat to leopard is bigger than the change
from dog to coyote, the direction of change is the same.
As for betweenness, we will mainly be interested in approximating β3⊲
〈β1, β2〉 rather than finding an exact definition, i.e. we will be looking for
propositional formulas that imply, and that are implied by β3⊲〈β1, β2〉.
Example 4. The change from a bedsit to a studio essentially corresponds to
an increase in size and comfort. In this sense, such a change is similar to
the change from a two-bedroom apartment to a three-bedroom apartment, or
even to a penthouse. We may consider, for instance:
Σ ⊢ two-bed-ap ∨ three-bed-ap ∨ penthouse→ two-bed-ap⊲〈bedsit, studio〉
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Σ ⊢ two-bed-ap⊲〈bedsit, studio〉 → two-bed-ap ∨ three-bed-ap ∨ loft ∨ penthouse
Only the direction of the change is taken into account here, and not the
amount of change. For instance, we might have
Σ ⊢ one-bed-ap ∨ two-bed-ap ∨ three-bed-ap ∨ penthouse
→ one-bed-ap⊲〈one-bed-ap, two-bed-ap〉
Note that the meaning of 〈., .〉 by itself cannot be expressed at the syntactic
level, i.e. .⊲〈., .〉 is treated as a ternary modality. Extrapolative inference
can then be formalized as follows:
(R,Σ) ⊢ β1 → γ1
(R,Σ) ⊢ β2 → γ2
(R,Σ) ⊢ β3 → γ3
Σ ⊢ β∗ → β1⊲〈β2, β3〉
Σ ⊢ γ1⊲〈γ2, γ3〉 → γ
∗
(R,Σ) ⊢ β∗ → γ∗
(E)
A diagrammatic representation is given in Figure 1(b). In this case, three
rules β1 → γ1, β2 → γ2 and β3 → γ3 are available, and we are interested in
deriving conclusions about a fourth situation β∗ which differs from β1 as β3
differs from β2. The conclusion γ
∗ which is derived exhaustively covers all
situations that differ from γ1 as γ3 differs from γ2.
Finally, we assume that the consequence relation ⊢ is deductively closed:
(R,Σ) ⊢ β1 → γ1
(R,Σ) ⊢ β2 → γ2
{β1 → γ1, β2 → γ2} |=A β3 → γ3
(R,Σ) ⊢ β3 → γ3
(D)
Example 5. Consider the rules from Example 2. Applying (S), we imme-
diately have
(R,Σ) ⊢ bungalow→ medium (R,Σ) ⊢ mansion→ very-large
Assuming
Σ ⊢ bungalow ∨ villa ∨mansion→ bungalow⋊⋉mansion
Σ ⊢ medium⋊⋉very-large→ medium ∨ large ∨ very-large
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we find using (I) that
(R,Σ) ⊢ bungalow ∨ villa ∨mansion→ medium ∨ large ∨ very-large
and using (D) that (R,Σ) ⊢ villa→ medium∨ large∨very-large which refines
the trivial conclusion that we obtained in Example 2. Similarly, we find using
(S) that
(R,Σ) ⊢ large ∧ detached→ lux
(R,Σ) ⊢ large ∧ row-house→ comf
(R,Σ) ⊢ small ∧ detached→ bas ∨ comf
If we now assume that (writing det for detached)
Σ ⊢ (large ∨medium ∨ small ∨ very-small) ∧ row-house
→ (large ∧ row-house)⊲〈large ∧ det, small ∧ det〉
Σ ⊢ comf⊲〈lux, bas ∨ comf〉 → bas ∨ comf
then (E) yields
(R,Σ) ⊢ (large ∨medium ∨ small ∨ very-small) ∧ row-house→ bas ∨ comf
(11)
from which we obtain using (D) that (R,Σ) ⊢ medium ∧ row-house→ bas ∨
comf. Indeed, the rule in (11) plays the role of β1 → γ1 from the definition
of (D), whereas the rule β2 → γ2 is trivial.
At this point it may not be clear whether the inference relation defined by
(S), (I), (E) and (D) always behaves according to intuition, nor what the
implications are at the semantic level of adopting (I) and (E). To this end, in
the following sections, we will develop a semantic counterpart of the inference
relation ⊢, which will clarify the nature of the modalities⋊⋉and ⊲〈, 〉 and will
allow us to implement decision procedures for reasoning tasks of interest. A
crucial issue that will be discussed in detail is the interaction between the
aforemetioned modalities on the one hand, and logical conjunction on the
other hand, e.g. discussing under which conditions (α1 ∧ β1) ⋊⋉ (α2 ∧ β2) is
equivalent to (α1 ⋊⋉α2) ∧ (β1 ⋊⋉β2).
The principles (I) and (E) allow us to refine a rule base R by exploiting
background knowledge about the conceptual relationship of labels from the
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same attribute domain. This background knowledge is of a qualitative na-
ture. Extrapolative reasoning, for instance, is based on the idea of direction
of change, but does not take the amount of change into account. An analog-
ical proportion such as a : b :: c : d, on the other hand, not only expresses
that the change from a to b goes in the same direction as the change from
c to d, but also that the amount of change between a and b is the same as
the amount of change between c and d [40]. To take information about the
amount of change into account, and thus generalize analogical reasoning —
making it also more cautious when necessary — we will use expressions such
as β1⊲[λ,µ]〈β2, β3〉 where 0 ≤ λ ≤ µ < +∞. Intuitively, this formula covers
all situations that can be obtained by changing β1 in the same direction as
the change from β2 to β3, such that the amount of change is between λ and µ
times as large as the amount of change between β2 and β3. This allows us to
make inferences which are more precise in cases where suitable information
about the amount of change is available. For example, knowing that the
amount of change between dog and coyote is approximately the same as the
amount of change between cat and lynx, the latter relationship is more useful
than the relationship between cat and leopard if we want to derive knowledge
about coyotes from knowledge about dogs.
The most straightforward use of this generalization is to express whether
the amount of change from β1 should be smaller, equal, or larger than the
amount of change from β2 to β3. In particular, β1⊲[1,1] 〈β2, β3〉 corresponds
to the solution X that makes β1 : X :: β2 : β3 a perfect analogical propor-
tion, while β1⊲[0,1[〈β2, β3〉 and β1⊲]1,+∞[〈β2, β3〉 express amounts of change
that are smaller and larger, respectively, than the amount of change from β2
to β3. Note that β1⊲[0,+∞[ 〈β2, β3〉 corresponds to β1⊲〈β2, β3〉. Also note
that in the aforementioned cases, the approach remains entirely qualitative.
Other choices for the intervals [λ, µ] may give the approach a more numer-
ical flavour, and would mainly be useful in scenarios where the conceptual
relationships are obtained using data-driven techniques.
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For τ a non-empty subset of [0,+∞[, Principle (E) can be refined to
(R,Σ) ⊢ β1 → γ1
(R,Σ) ⊢ β2 → γ2
(R,Σ) ⊢ β3 → γ3
Σ ⊢ β∗ → β1⊲τ 〈β2, β3〉
Σ ⊢ γ1⊲τ 〈γ2, γ3〉 → γ
∗
(R,Σ) ⊢ β∗ → γ∗
(E’)
Along similar lines, for σ a non-empty subset of [0, 1], we consider expressions
of the form β1 ⋊⋉σ β2 to put constraints on the relative closeness to β1 and
β2. Specifically, β1 ⋊⋉[0,0.5[β2 corresponds to those situations between β1 and
β2 that are closer to β1 than to β2. Note that β1 ⋊⋉[0,0.5[β2 is a refinement of
the construct β1 ⇔ β2 from CSL [29], as betweenness is not required in CSL,
only comparative closeness. Similarly, β1 ⋊⋉]0.5,1]β2 corresponds to situations
that are closer to β2 than to β1, and β1 ⋊⋉[0.5,0.5] β2 to situations that are
exactly halfway. When data-driven techniques are used, other intervals may
again be useful. In scenarios where labels can be assumed to be equidistant,
we may also know e.g. that small → very-small ⋊⋉[0.25,0.25] very-large and
large → very-small ⋊⋉[0.75,0.75] very-large, where the idea is that medium is
halfway between very-small and very-large and small is halfway between
very-small and medium.
Principle (I) can be refined to
(R,Σ) ⊢ β1 → γ1
(R,Σ) ⊢ β2 → γ2
Σ ⊢ β∗ → β1 ⋊⋉σ β2
Σ ⊢ γ1 ⋊⋉σ γ2 → γ
∗
(R,Σ) ⊢ β∗ → γ∗
(I’)
Example 6. Consider again the setting of Example 5, and assume that a
villa is conceptually halfway between a bungalow and a mansion, and that a
large house is conceptually halfway between a medium house and a very-large
house. We then get
Σ ⊢ villa→ bungalow⋊⋉[0.5,0.5]mansion (12)
Σ ⊢ medium⋊⋉[0.5,0.5] very-large→ large (13)
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which allows us the obtain the refined conclusion (R,Σ) ⊢ villa→ large using
(I’) and (D). Alternatively, we could assume that a villa is conceptually
closer to a bungalow than to a mansion, by assuming that
Σ ⊢ bungalow ∨ villa→ bungalow⋊⋉[0,0.5[mansion
Together with
Σ ⊢ medium⋊⋉[0,0.5[ very-large→ medium ∨ large
we would then find R ⊢ villa→ medium ∨ large.
3.2. Mappings between attribute domains
At the semantic level, a rule base R can be seen as a mapping between
sets of vectors of attributes. In particular, assume that all the labels in the
antecedents of the rules in R belong to the attribute domains B1, ..., Bs and
that the labels in the consequents belong to C1, ..., Ck. The rule base R
can then equivalently be expressed as a function fR from subsets of B =
B1 × ...×Bs to subsets of C = C1 × ...× Ck, defined for X ⊆ B as
fR(X) =
⋂{
Y ∈ 2C |R |=A
( ∨
(x1,...,xs)∈X
s∧
i=1
xi
)
→
( ∨
(y1,...,yk)∈Y
k∧
i=1
yi
)}
where A = A1 × ... × An and {A1, ..., An} = {B1, ..., Bs} ∪ {C1, ..., Ck} as
before. It is not hard to see that this function indeed expresses the same
knowledge as the rule base R. Furthermore, there exists a single Y ∗ ∈ 2C
such that fR(X) = Y
∗ and
R |=A
( ∨
(x1,...,xs)∈X
s∧
i=1
xi
)
→
( ∨
(y1,...,yk)∈Y ∗
k∧
i=1
yi
)
Example 7. Consider again the rules base from Example 2. We have that
B = A1 × A2 × A3, as no rule refers to comfort levels in its antecedent, and
C = A2 ×A3 ×A4, as only the coarser housing types of A2 are referred to in
the consequent of rules. We find that a small detached villa is either basic or
comfortable:
fR({(villa, det, small)}) = {(det, small, bas), (det, small, comf)}
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Indeed, from
small ∧ detached→ bas ∨ comf
It follows that
small ∧ detached ∧ villa→ (bas ∨ comf) ∧ small ∧ detached
from which we can already conclude
fR({(villa, det, small)}) ⊆ {(det, small, bas), (det, small, comf)}
It is furthermore clear that there are no rules in R which could be used to
further refine fR({(villa, det, small)}).
Similarly, we find that a bungalow is detached and medium-sized, while
we find no restrictions on the possible comfort levels:
fR({(bun, x, y) |x ∈ A2, y ∈ A3}) = {(det,medium, z) | z ∈ A4}
We may see fR as an approximate (i.e. incomplete) model of a given
domain, which may be refined as soon as new information becomes available.
In particular, for two 2B → 2C functions f and f ′ which are monotone w.r.t.
set inclusion, we say that f is a refinement of f ′, written f ≤ f ′, iff
∀X ⊆ B . f(X) ⊆ f ′(X) (14)
This idea of using monotone set-valued functions to describe approximate
models is closely linked to the theory of Scott domains; see e.g. [41] for an
elaboration of this idea. At the semantic level, completing the rule base
R boils down to refining the corresponding function fR. In our approach,
such refinements will be based on meta-knowledge about the nature of the
relationship between B and C. This will lead us to replace fR by the largest
refinement, w.r.t. ≤, which is compatible with the imposed meta-knowledge.
In particular, as will become clear below, Principles (I) and (E) amount
to refine fR by imposing some form of monotonicity, whereas (I’) and (E’)
amount to refine fR by imposing a form of linearity. As could be expected,
the meta-knowledge underlying (I’) and (E’) is stronger than the meta-
knowledge underlying (I) and (E).
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4. Formalization using conceptual spaces
The approach sketched in Section 3 requires information about how the
labels of an attribute domain are conceptually related to each other. Provided
that this information is available, inference can be carried out purely at the
symbolic level. However, to justify the inference procedure, and to provide an
adequate semantics for it, we need to be precise on how relationships such as
betweenness should be interpreted. To this end, we assume that the cognitive
meaning of the attributes can be represented geometrically, as convex regions
in a conceptual space. Conceptual relationships can then be given a clear
spatial interpretation, as will be discussed in Section 4.1. Taking advantage
of this link with conceptual spaces, Section 4.2 subsequently reviews some
opportunities for the acquisition of conceptual relations. Finally, Section 4.3
presents the idea of regular mappings between conceptual spaces as a basis
for interpolative and extrapolative reasoning.
4.1. Geometric modelling of attribute domains
The theory of conceptual spaces [13] is centered around the assumption
that the meaning of a natural property can be adequately modelled as a
convex region in some geometric space. Formally, a conceptual space is
the Cartesian product Q1 × ... × Qm of quality dimensions, each of which
corresponds to an atomic, cognitively meaningful feature, called a quality. A
standard example is the conceptual space of colors, which can be described
using the quality dimensions hue, saturation and intensity. Labels to describe
colors, in some natural language, are then posited to correspond to convex
regions in this conceptual space, a view which is closely related to the ideas
of prototype theory [42]. The label red for instance will be represented by
the set of points whose hue is in the spectrum normally associated with red,
whose saturation is sufficiently high, and whose intensity is neither too high
nor too low. Note that while e.g. red may be an atomic property at the
symbolic level, at the cognitive level it is defined in terms of more primitive
notions. Quality dimensions may be continuous or discrete, and can even
be finite. In practice, however, it is common to identify conceptual spaces
with Euclidean spaces [42], and to define cognitive similarity in terms of
Euclidean distance. We will also adopt this simplifying view throughout the
paper, although part of the discussion readily generalizes to more general
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spaces2.
Now consider again the example of housing types. A conceptual space to
represent housing types would have a large number of dimensions, relating
to shape, size, colour, texture, etc. Each house that exists in the world will
correspond to one specific point in this conceptual space. Conversely, how-
ever, there may be points in that conceptual space which do not correspond
to structures that can be physically realized, or that would not be recognized
as houses (e.g. a building structure of 20 km long and 1 cm wide). Each at-
tribute from the domain A1 corresponds to a convex region in the conceptual
space, where intuitively, e.g. the region corresponding to villa corresponds to
those building structures that are more similar to prototypical villas than to
prototypical instances of the other attributes in A1.
In general, each attribute domain Ai thus corresponds to a partition of
some conceptual space in convex regions, where each attribute of Ai corre-
sponds to a partition class. As some regions of conceptual spaces may corre-
spond to types of instances that do not exist in the real world, the number of
partition classes may, in principle be higher than the number of attributes in
Ai. We write reg(x) to denote the convex region that corresponds to label x.
For example, reg(three-bed-ap) represents all sections of building structures
that could be classified as three-bedroom apartments. This set will contain
both points that correspond to actual apartments (which exist somewhere
in the world) and possible apartments (which may in principle be built one
day).
This conceptual space representation of the attributes is considerably
richer than what can be described at the symbolic level, and therefore also
allows for richer forms of inference. However, in most application domains,
it is not reasonable to assume that such representations are available. More-
over, the precise representation of a property in a conceptual space strongly
depends on the considered context and may be subjective. Usually, however,
it is assumed that a particular conceptual space representation can be ob-
tained from a generic representation by appropriately rescaling the quality
dimensions [44]. Note that this observation implies that also similarity judge-
ments may differ across contexts and people, as rescaling the dimensions may
2In particular, interpolative reasoning can be carried out w.r.t. any space for which
betweenness can meaningfully be defined. See e.g. [43] for a formalization of conceptual
spaces in terms of a primitive betweenness relation.
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influence the relative Euclidean distance between points. For instance, while
apples are usually considered to be closer to tomatoes than to chocolate, in
the context of desserts, they may be closer to chocolate (e.g. because both
can be used in cakes). To alleviate these issues, we will rely on (mainly) qual-
itative knowledge about the spatial relationship of different properties. Such
qualitative knowledge may be easier to obtain, and because the spatial rela-
tions that will be considered are invariant under affine transformations (such
as rescaling the quality dimensions), they are more robust against changes in
context and person. In particular, such relations are not affected by rescal-
ing of the quality dimensions, although they would still depend on context
changes that introduce additional quality dimensions.
For each attribute domain Ai, we assume that information is available
about betweenness and parallelism of the conceptual space representation of
its attributes. For example, we may intuitively think of a studio to be between
a bedsit and a one-bedroom apartment. In the domain of music genres, we
may consider that the change from hard-rock to progressive-rock is parallel
to the change from heavy-metal to progressive-metal, and that progressive-
rock is between hard-rock and avant-garde. The notions of betweenness and
parallelism are straightforwardly defined for points in Euclidean spaces. In
particular, let us write bet(p, q, r) to denote that q lies between p and r (on
the same line), and par(p, q, r, s) to denote that the vectors −→pq and −→rs point
in the same direction. The fact that point q is between points p and r means
that for every point x it holds that d(q, x) ≤ max(d(p, x), d(r, x)), and in
particular, that whenever p and r are close to a prototype of some concept,
then q is close to it as well. In this sense, we may see bet(p, q, r) as a way to
express that whatever natural properties p and r have in common, p and q
have them in common as well (identifying points in a conceptual space with
instances). On the other hand, par(p, q, r, s) intuitively means that to arrive
at s, r needs to be changed in the same way as p needs to be changed to
arrive at q, i.e. at the qualitative level, p is to q as r is to s (although the
amount of change may be different).
The notions of betweenness and parallelism, which are defined for points,
need to be extended to regions, in order to describe relationships between
attributes. As is well known, this can be done in different ways [45]. We will
consider the following two notions of betweenness for regions A, B, and C
(in a given Euclidean space):
bet(A,B,C) iff ∃q ∈ B .∃p ∈ A .∃r ∈ C . bet(p, q, r) (15)
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(a) Betweenness (b) Parallelism
Figure 2: Modelling betweenness and parallelism between regions.
bet(A,B,C) iff ∀q ∈ B .∃p ∈ A .∃r ∈ C . bet(p, q, r) (16)
In particular, if A and C are convex regions, bet(A,B,C) holds if B overlaps
with the convex hull of A ∪ C, whereas bet(A,B,C) holds if B is included
in this convex hull. These two notions of betweenness are illustrated in
Figure 2(a), where bet(A,B1, C), bet(A,B1, C) and bet(A,B2, C) hold, but
not bet(A,B2, C). Note in particular that both relations are reflexive w.r.t.
the first two arguments, in the sense that e.g. bet(A,A,C) holds, as well
as symmetric, in the sense that e.g. bet(A,B,C) ≡ bet(C,B,A). However,
transitivity does not necessarily hold for regions, e.g. from bet(A,B,C) and
bet(B,C,D) we cannot infer that bet(A,B,D); a counterexample is depicted
in Figure 3(a)3. In the terminology of rough set theory [46], bet and bet cor-
respond to upper and lower approximations of betweenness. The underlying
idea is that, given our finite set of labels, we may not be able to exactly
describe the convex hull of two regions A and B. All we can do, then, is to
list all labels which are completely included in the convex hull (i.e. define the
lower approximation of the convex hull), and all labels which have a non-
empty intersection with the convex hull (i.e. define the upper approximation
3This counterexample also illustrates a technical subtlety of the considered framework.
If we want to represent the meaning of each label as a topologically closed set, then
regions will inevitably share their boundary with other regions, which is not compatible
with the view that different labels (of the same attribute domain) refer to pairwise disjoint
properties. One solution to this problem is to associate with each label a topologically open
region, and introduce topologically closed regions that correspond to borderline instances,
i.e. instances for which it is hard to tell whether they belong to one concept or to another.
In Figure 3(a), nothing prevents us from taking B and C to be topologically open regions.
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(a) We have
bet(A,B,C) and
bet(B,C,D) but not
bet(A,B,D).
(b) We have par(A,B,C;D) and par(C,D,E;F ) but
not par(A,B,E;F ).
Figure 3: The relations bet and par are not transitive.
of the convex hull). In the following, for the ease of presentation we will
often identify labels with the corresponding regions, writing e.g. bet(a, b, c)
for bet(reg(a), reg(b), reg(c)).
Example 8. In the domain of housing types, we may consider that we have
bet(three-bed-ap, loft, penthouse) but not bet(three-bed-ap, loft, penthouse). Note
that this corresponds to what was expressed at the syntactic level in Example
3.
For regions A, B, C and D (in a given Euclidean space), two notions of
parallelism will be considered:
par(A,B,C;D) iff ∃s ∈ D .∃p ∈ A,∃q ∈ B, ∃r ∈ C .∃λ ≥ 0 .−→rs = λ · −→pq
par(A,B,C;D) iff ∀s ∈ D .∃p ∈ A,∃q ∈ B, ∃r ∈ C .∃λ ≥ 0 .−→rs = λ · −→pq
For parallelism, the role of the convex hull is replaced by a notion of conical
extension, which is illustrated in Figure 2(b). In particular, if par(A,B,C;D)
holds, some point in D differs from some point in C in the same direction
that some point in B differs from some point in A. In the scenario of Figure
2(b), this means that D overlaps with the shaded area. Likewise, when
par(A,B,C;D) holds, D is included in the shaded area of Figure 2(b). For
all regions A, B and C, we have that par(A,B,C;C) holds (and thus also
par(A,B,C;C)), as well as par(A,B,A;B). However, as for betweenness,
transitivity does not hold, as is illustrated in Figure 3(b).
Example 9. We may consider that the following relations hold (cf. Example
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4)
par(bedsit, studio, two-bed-ap; loft)
par(bedsit, studio, two-bed-ap; three-bed-ap)
In other words, for every point s in reg(three-bed) we can find points p ∈
reg(bedsit), q ∈ reg(studio) and r ∈ reg(two-bed-ap) such that −→pq is parallel
to −→rs. In other words, every three-bedroom apartment differs from some two-
bedroom apartment in (qualitatively) the same way as some studio differs
from some bedsit. Similarly, we have that some (but not all) lofts differ from
some two-bedroom apartment in the same way that some studio differs from
some bedsit.
As a refinement of bet(p, q, r), we may put constraints on the distance
ratio d(p,q)
d(p,r)
, where d denotes the Euclidean distance. Note that distance
ratios for points on the same line are preserved under affine transformations.
In particular, for σ a subset of [0, 1], we consider the following relations:
betσ(A,B,C) iff ∃q ∈ B .∃p ∈ A .∃r ∈ C . bet(p, q, r) (17)
∧ (∃λ ∈ σ . d(p, q) = λ · d(p, r))
betσ(A,B,C) iff ∀q ∈ B .∃p ∈ A .∃r ∈ C . bet(p, q, r) (18)
∧ (∃λ ∈ σ . d(p, q) = λ · d(p, r))
Clearly, bet = bet[0,1] and bet = bet[0,1]. Other notable cases are σ = [0.5, 0.5],
when (17)–(18) express that B is halfway between A and C, σ =]0.5, 1], when
(17)–(18) express that B is closer to C than to A, and σ = [0, 0.5[, when
(17)–(18) express that B is closer to A than to C. Note that we can only
have bet[0,0](reg(a), reg(b), reg(c)) if a = b since labels from the same attribute
domain are assumed to be disjoint. A similar refinement of parallelism is
possible, where for τ a subset of [0,+∞[, we define
parτ (A,B,C;D) iff ∃s ∈ D .∃p ∈ A,∃q ∈ B, ∃r ∈ C .∃λ ∈ τ .
−→rs = λ · −→pq
(19)
parτ (A,B,C;D) iff ∀s ∈ D .∃p ∈ A,∃q ∈ B, ∃r ∈ C .∃λ ∈ τ .
−→rs = λ · −→pq
(20)
In the particular case where τ = [1, 1], (19)-(20) extend the idea of a par-
allelogram, whose relationship to the idea of analogical proportion is well
known.
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4.2. Acquiring conceptual relations
Regarding the applicability of our approach, an important question is how
the required relational knowledge about conceptual spaces can be obtained,
e.g. how do we find out that a studio is conceptually between a bedsit and
a one-bedroom apartment? Depending on the specific application, different
options may be available.
Manual encoding
In some domains, it is feasible to manually encode a complete qualitative
description of a conceptual space. Most notably, this is the case for concep-
tual spaces that are unidimensional, for which it suffices to provide a ranking
of the labels of interest. For instance, a conceptual space of housing sizes
may be described by encoding that
very-small < small < medium < large < very-large
From this description, we immediately obtain that, for example, the relations
bet(very-small,medium, large) and par(very-small, small,medium; very-large)
hold. Note that in unidimensional domains, the relations bet and bet coincide
when applied to labels of the same attribute domain (as these correspond to
disjoint intervals), as do the relations par and par. In multi-dimensional
domains, it may still be the case that providing a qualitative description
is mainly a matter of ranking. The qualitative description of such simple
multi-dimensional conceptual spaces can easily be modelled using a diagram.
Figure 4 provides an example of such a diagram, where lines define tuples
that satisfy bet and parallel lines define tuples that satisfy par. For example,
in the case of Figure 4, we have that
par(2-bed-ap, 3-bed-ap, 2-bed-rowhouse; 3-bed-rowhouse)
As the formalization of such diagrams is straightforward, we will not discuss
it in detail. However, it should be clear that a diagrammatic representation
can only be obtained when some simplifying conditions are met. For example,
in Figure 4, it is tacitly assumed that bet = bet and par = par, and moreover
that many transitivity and mixed transitivity properties are assumed for
bet and par that do not hold in general (e.g. bet(a, b, c) ∧ par(b, c, d; e) ⇒
par(a, c, d; e)). While such diagrams can therefore not account for the full
generality offered by the relations bet, bet, par and par, in simple domains,
as the housing example of Figure 4, they offer a convenient way of modelling
our intuitions about the conceptual relationships that hold.
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Figure 4: Qualitative description of a conceptual space of housing types.
Natural language processing
A second possibility is to extract conceptual relations from natural lan-
guage. In [47], for instance, the idea of latent relational analysis was in-
troduced, with the aim of identifying analogical proportions. As instances
of par[1,1] correspond to analogical proportions, conceptual relations of this
particular type can be obtained in the same way. The main idea is that two
pairs of words are likely to be related analogously, i.e. form an analogical
proportion, when the lexical contexts in which they co-occur are similar. For
example, the words kitten and cat are found in sentences such as “a kitten is
a young cat”, while the words chick and chicken are found in sentences such
as “a chick is a young chicken”. From such observations, the analogical pro-
portion kitten : cat :: chick : chicken can be discovered. Another technique
for discovering analogical proportions from the web was proposed in [48], es-
timating the strength of analogical proportions by converting co-occurrence
statistics using Kolmogorov information theory. Instances of bet[0.5,0.5](a, b, c)
could be identified with analogical proportions of the form a : b :: b : c.
In principle, instances of bet and bet can be discovered by applying general
methods for extracting ternary relations from text [49]. However, it is clear
that the use of information extraction techniques to define the relations bet,
bet, par and par will necessarily by highly heuristic, due to the inherent im-
perfection of such methods.
Data-driven techniques
If sufficient information is available about instances of concepts or prop-
erties, several data-driven approaches can be used, which directly take ad-
vantage of the geometric nature of the relations of interest. For instance, [42]
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suggests to start from pairwise similarity judgements between instances, and
use multi-dimensional scaling to obtain coordinates for them in a Euclidean
space. Representations of concepts can then be obtained by determining
the corresponding Voronoi tessellation, after which the conceptual relations
of interest can be evaluated by straightforward geometric calculations. The
number of dimensions of the resulting space can be freely chosen, where
fewer dimensions lead to more conceptual relationships, as only the most
prominent dimensions of the conceptual space are then taken into account.
Thus, the lower the number of dimensions, the less cautious the resulting
inference mechanism will be. In [50], the feasibility of such an approach was
demonstrated in the domain of music genres, using similarity judgements that
were obtained indirectly using user-contributed meta-data from the website
last.fm4.
Rather than starting from similarity judgements, [14] suggests an ap-
proach based on singular value decomposition (SVD), which is a form of
dimensionality reduction. Translated to our setting, the approach would
start from a matrix where rows correspond to instances and columns corre-
spond to binary features that these instances may or may not have. Instances
are then represented in a high-dimensional space with one dimension for each
feature, and coordinates are either 0 or 1, depending on whether the instance
has the corresponding feature. Using SVD, a linear transformation is then
determined which maps this high-dimensional space onto a space of lower
dimension, with real-valued coordinates. As before, the resulting representa-
tions of the instance can be used to generate geometric representations of the
concepts. Again we have that the chosen number of dimensions determines
to what extent all quality dimensions, or only the most prominent ones are
taken into account. Note that this latter approach offers an interesting con-
nection between representations of concepts as sets of features and geometric
representations, which also allows us to make the relationship between ana-
logical proportions and parallelism explicit. In particular, assume that the
analogical proportion a : b :: c : d holds for the instances a, b, c and d, and
let their sets of features be denoted by A, B, C and D respectively. Accord-
ing to the formal definition of analogical proportion [40, 32], we have that
A\B = C \D and B \A = D \C (where we write \ for set difference). From
this observation, it is easy to see that the representations of a, b, c and d form
4http://www.last.fm
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a parallelogram in the initial, high-dimensional {0, 1}-valued space. Since,
parallelograms are preserved under linear transformations, a, b, c and d will
still form a parallelogram in the resulting conceptual spaces representation.
Note that in principle, due to the lower number of dimensions, the conceptual
space may contain more quadruples of instances that form a parallelogram
than the initial space. These parallelograms intuitively correspond to pairs
of instances that are analogical in all relevant aspects.
Alternatively, the SVD approach can also be applied when feature repre-
sentations of concepts, rather than instances, are available. The concepts are
then represented as points, and betweenness and parallelism of these points
may be taken to be indicative of betweenness and parallelism of the unknown
representations of the concepts as regions.
Example 10. Consider a rule base about red wines. From a web page about
red wines5 we learn the following knowledge
beaujolais→ low-tan ∧ light-body
inexpensive ∧ burgundy→ low-tan ∧ light-body
bardolino→ low-tan ∧ light-body
valpolicella→ low-tan ∧ light-body
inexpensive ∧ bordeaux→ low-tan ∧med-body
chianti→ low-tan ∧med-body
rioja→ low-tan ∧med-body
merlot→ (low-tan ∨mid-tan) ∧med-body
mid-range ∧ burgundy→ low-tan ∧med-body
inexpensive ∧ cabernet-sauvignon→ low-tan ∧med-body
mid-range ∧ bordeaux→ mid-tan ∧med-body
above-average ∧ cabernet-sauvignon→ mid-tan ∧med-body
zinfandel→ (mid-tan ∨ high-tan) ∧ (med-body ∨ full-body)
shiraz→ (mid-tan ∨ high-tan) ∧ (med-body ∨ full-body)
high-end ∧ bordeaux→ high-tan ∧ full-body
high-end ∧ burgundy→ high-tan ∧ full-body
high-end ∧ cabernet-sauvignon→ high-tan ∧ full-body
5http://randomnetstuff.com/wineplace/redwine.php, accessed July 28th, 2011.
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barolo→ high-tan ∧ full-body
barbaresco→ high-tan ∧ full-body
brunello-di-montalcino→ high-tan ∧ full-body
low-tan ∧ light-body→ light-red
low-tan ∧med-body→ med-red
mid-tan ∧med-body→ dark-red ∨ opaque
high-tan ∧ full-body→ opaque
Given the large number of wine types that exist, inevitably some types are
not contained in this rule base. Let us consider, as an example, the wines
Barbera and Bandol. From another web page about wine6, we extract in-
formation about wine–food pairings. For each listed wine type, we create a
vector with one component for every listed food type. This component is set
to 1 if the wine is mentioned as appropriate for the corresponding food type,
and to 0 otherwise. Assuming that wine–food pairings are based on the taste
of the wine, they may provide a valuable source of information about how dif-
ferent wines are related to each other. Using the SVD technique, we reduce
the dimension of these vectors to a specified (typically somewhat arbitrary)
number of abstract dimensions; in this example, we take 5 dimensions. As
every wine type is then represented as a point in a 5-dimensional space, we
can calculate which wines are between which other ones. In particular, if the
cosine of the angle between
−→
ab and −→ac is sufficiently close to 1, for a, b and c
the vector representations of three wine types a, b and c, and if ‖
−→
ab‖ < ‖−→ac‖,
we assume that the taste of wine b is between that of wines a and c. Simi-
larly, if the cosine of the angle between
−→
ab and
−→
cd is sufficiently close to 1,
we assume that the change from wine a to wine b goes in the same direction
as the change from wine c to wine d. In this way, we obtained that Barbera is
between Chianti and Merlot (requiring the cosine to be at least 0.975). Given
that these latter two wines, have either low or medium tannins, we can derive
using interpolative inference that the same should hold for Barbera. Bandol,
on the other hand, is not found to be between any two other types of wine.
However, we do find that the following pairs 〈(a, b), (c, d)〉 correspond to par-
6http://www.theworldwidewine.com/Wine_and_Food/This_wine_which_foods.
php, accessed July 18th, 2011.
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allel changes in wine type (again requiring the cosine to be at least 0.975):
〈(bandol, cabernet-sauvignon), (bordeaux, barolo)〉
〈(bandol, zinfandel), (barolo, barbera)〉
〈(bandol, zinfandel), (bordeaux, barbera)〉
Given that the change from both Barolo and Bordeaux to Barbera is towards
lower tannins, using extrapolative reasoning we derive that the amount of
tannins in Bandol should not be smaller than the amount found in Zinfandel,
i.e. we find that Bandol either has medium or high tannins.
Note that these data-driven approaches essentially use quantitative in-
formation to obtain a qualitative representation. One reason for not using
a purely quantitative approach is that the available data is not likely to be
sufficiently informative to build accurate conceptual space representations,
but still allows us to discover information about qualitative relations between
regions. In the case of Example 10, for instance, the quantitative represen-
tation we start with represents each concept as a point rather than a convex
region. A second reason is that geometric calculations, such as determining
convex hulls or Voronoi tessellations, are computationally expensive in high-
dimensional spaces. When all we are interested in are spatial relations such
as betweenness and parallelism, we can avoid to actually build the concep-
tual space, using a linear programming approach that was proposed in [50].
Finally, as mentioned before, qualitative representations are invariant w.r.t.
changes in the relative importance of the different quality dimensions.
4.3. Regular mappings between conceptual spaces
In this section, we show how the idea of interpolation and extrapolation
can be formalized, and explicate the assumptions that warrant such forms
of inference. We start from the functional view on rule bases suggested in
Section 3.2. In particular, given the view of attribute domains as granular
descriptions of conceptual spaces, we may look at mappings between attribute
domains as granular descriptions of mappings between conceptual spaces.
Let A = A1 × ... × An, B = B1 × ... × Bs and C = C1 × ... × Ck be defined
as before. As each Ai, Bj and Cl correspond to a conceptual space, also
A, B and C correspond to conceptual spaces, which we will denote by A,
B and C respectively. Note that the set of quality dimensions underlying
A is the union of the quality dimensions underlying the conceptual space
representations of A1, ..., An and similar for B and C.
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The mapping fR, induced by the knowledge base R, can then be seen as
a mapping from subsets of B to subsets of C. The nature of this mapping
will strongly depend on the nature of the rules involved. For example, let us
consider the following rules
studio→ small
high-tannins ∧ full-body→ opaque
museum ∧ has-live-animals→ zoo
large ∧ orchestra→ symphony
In these rules, the consequent is implied (only) by the meaning of the terms
that appear in the antecedent, e.g. a museum which has live animals is called
a zoo, by definition of the word zoo. As a result, we can make the assumption
that the quality dimensions in C form a subset of the quality dimensions in
B. This in turn means that there is a linear mapping m (viz. a projection)
from B to the lower-dimensional space C. The (known) mapping fR can then
be seen as an approximation of the (unknown) mapping m. Note that this
means that there is an underlying functional dependency, e.g. every housing
option will have a specific size, and every wine will have a specific degree of
transparency. We will refer to rules of this kind as categorization rules.
Categorization rules can be contrasted with phenomenological rules, which
encode observations about the world, e.g.:
morning→ heavy-traffic
autumn ∧ UK→ rainy
While in the four previous rules, the conclusion is the consequence of a cat-
egorical definition, in case of phemenological rules, there is usually no un-
derlying functional dependency: knowing the time of the day does not allow
us to precisely know the amount of traffic, while knowing the date and loca-
tion does not allow us to precisely know the amount of rain. Interestingly,
a similar link between commonsense reasoning and functional dependencies
was already pointed out in [51].
The method we propose in this paper is based on the assumption that a
rule base approximates a linear mapping, and thus only applies to categoriza-
tion rules. However, it is worth noting that even for phenomenological rules,
our method can often produce plausible conclusions when it is applied locally,
e.g. while we should not conclude that there is heavy traffic at mid-day from
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the observations that there is heavy traffic in the morning and in the evening,
it makes sense to conclude that there is heavy-traffic mid-morning if we know
that there is heavy traffic in the early morning and late morning. Moreover,
whether a rule classifies as phenomenological or not may depend on the un-
derlying conceptual space representations that are assumed. For instance,
the conceptual space representation of morning may in fact include a quality
dimension for the amount of traffic, when mornings (in cities) and rush hour
are considered to be so tied together that traffic jams become a characteristic
feature of mornings (in a similar way that flying has become a characteristic
feature of birds, even if it is not a defining feature). As a result of these
considerations, when applying our method in practice, we would by default
assume that it contains categorization rules. When this does not introduce
any inconsistencies, the conclusions it produces are in some sense the most
plausible ones, given the information that it available. When inconsistencies
are introduced in the process, however, we may need to partially revise the
assumption that the rules are categorization rules and/or that the concep-
tual relations we have are appropriate in the given context (i.e. take into
account all the relevant features). While interpolative and extrapolative rea-
soning are monotonic forms of reasoning in principle, in practice they would
be applied in a non-monotonic fashion, in the sense that adding more rules
to a knowledge base may introduce inconsistencies, which would then lead us
to apply interpolation and extrapolation more cautiously (or not at all). In
Section 8, we will come back to the issue of how to deal with inconsistencies
that are introduced by interpolative or extrapolative reasoning.
By taking the view that fR is the approximation of an unknown mapping
m from points of B to points of C, we have for X ⊆ B that reg(fR(X)) ⊇
{m(p) | p ∈ reg(X)}, where we write reg(X) for the geometric representation
of X as a region in B or C as before. More precisely, we take the view that
the rule base R is compatible with some underlying mapping m in the sense
that for each X ⊆ B and Y ⊆ C it holds that(
R |=A
( ∨
x∈X
s∧
i=1
xi
)
→
( ∨
y∈Y
k∧
i=1
yi
))
⇒
(
m∗
( ⋃
x∈X
reg(x)
)
⊆
⋃
y∈Y
reg(y)
)
(21)
where the 2B → 2C mapping m∗ is defined as the pointwise extension of m.
The actual conceptual spaces B and C, and a fortiori the mapping m,
are inaccessible in most applications. For instance, we cannot assume that a
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Figure 5: Mappings from B (left) to C (right).
precise definition of a loft is available, or even an exhaustive enumeration of
the qualities on which such a definition would depend. Moreover, using our
finite vocabulary, we can only encode approximations of the mappingm, even
in the face of complete knowledge. Let us write f̂ for the most informative
approximation that can be described using the available labels, i.e. f̂ is the
2B → 2C mapping defined for X ∈ 2B by
f̂(X) = {y ∈ C |x ∈ X,m∗(reg(x)) ∩ reg(y) 6= ∅}
In other words, fR corresponds to the knowledge we actually have, while f̂
corresponds to the maximal knowledge about the mapping m that we could
hope to obtain.
Example 11. Figure 5 displays a setting where B and C consist of only
one attribute domain, where B = B1 = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i} and C = C1 =
{j, k, l, n, o, u, v, w, x, y, z}. The mapping m maps each point from B to a
point of C. The only knowledge that we have about m is in the forms of rules
in the rule base R, which act as constraints on the mapping m. Assume, for
example, that R contains the rule d→ n∨u∨v∨w, and no other information
about d. Then we have that fR({d}) = {n, u, v, w}. This mapping fR is an
approximation of the mapping m, for which e.g. m(p) = r and m(q) = s
holds. Now suppose that for every point x in reg(d) it holds that m(x) ∈
reg(n) ∪ reg(v), i.e. m∗(reg(d)) = {m(x) |x ∈ reg(d)} ⊆ reg(n) ∪ reg(v).
Then the most precise mapping f̂ that can be described using the vocabulary
offered by B and C is such that f̂({d}) = {n, v}. This means that the rule
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d→ n∨u∨ v∨w could be refined to d→ n∨ v, but this knowledge is missing
from R.
The mapping f̂ is not available to us either; it corresponds to the semantic
counterpart of a complete rule base, i.e. a rule base which entails all rules
that are compatible with m. All we know about f̂ is that it is a refinement
of fR.
Proposition 1. If R is compatible with m in the sense of (21), it holds that
f̂ ≤ fR.
Hence the goal of refining the knowledge base R corresponds, at the
semantic level, to finding a mapping f̂R for which it is known that f̂ ≤
f̂R ≤ fR. As all our domain knowledge is already encoded in R, a suitable
f̂R 6= fR can only be obtained from meta-knowledge about the mapping f̂ , or
indirectly, from meta-knowledge about the mapping m. Here our restriction
to categorization rules plays a key role, as it suggests thatm should satisfy the
properties of a linear transformation. This leads to the following postulates
about the mapping m (p, q, r, s ∈ B, λ ≥ 0):
(bet1) bet(p, q, r)⇒ bet(m(p),m(q),m(r))
(bet2) bet(p, q, r)∧ d(p, q) = λ · d(r, q)⇒ d(m(p),m(q)) = λ · d(m(r),m(q))
(par1) par(p, q, r, s)⇒ par(m(p),m(q),m(r),m(s))
(par2) par(p, q, r, s)∧d(p, q) = λ·d(r, s)⇒ d(m(p),m(q)) = λ·d(m(r),m(s))
In the following section, these postulates will be related to the commonsense
inference principles that were introduced in Section 3.1. Specifically, it will
become clear that the validity of Principle (I) is tied to (bet1), the validity
of (E) is tied to (par1), the validity of (I’) is tied to (bet1) and (bet2),
and the validity of (E’) is tied to (par1) and (par2).
5. Semantic characterization
To characterize interpolative and extrapolative inference, it is useful to
note that knowledge can be described on three levels, in the given setting.
First, there is the syntactic level, where new rules are produced from given
sets of rules. This level will form the topic of Section 6. Second, there is the
conceptual spaces level, where labels are represented as geometric regions,
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and knowledge takes the form of relations between geometric representations
of properties and concepts, as was described in Section 4. Finally, there is an
intermediate level which we will refer to as the semantic level, as it describes
knowledge in terms of a standard propositional logic semantics. In particular,
as explained in the beginning of Section 3, the elements of A take the role
of interpretations of the propositional rules and formulas that we consider.
This intermediate, semantic level will form the topic of the present section.
In particular, at the semantic level, we are interested in approximating the
mapping m between the conceptual spaces B and C, as well as relations such
as betweenness and parallelism, using the vocabulary at hand. Typically, for
a given conceptual space, a number of attribute domains D1, ..., Dl will be
available, containing labels to refer to designated regions of the conceptual
space. For the conceptual spaces B and C, these are respectively the attribute
domains B1, ..., Bs and C1, ..., Ck. In general, the available attribute domains
determine the level of granularity with which we can describe the underlying
conceptual space.
The considered setting of three levels requires us to take into account
some subtleties regarding the notion of logical consistency. A logical formula
α was defined to be consistent w.r.t. D1 × ...×Dl if there exists an element
d ∈ D1× ...×Dl that corresponds to a propositional model of that formula.
However, in general, we are not guaranteed that d actually corresponds to
a non-empty region of the underlying conceptual space D. That is because
some of the attribute domains may refer to the same quality dimensions. For
example, while blue ∧ wine may be consistent at the propositional level, it
corresponds to an empty set in the underlying conceptual space.
Let us call two attribute domains orthogonal if the sets of quality dimen-
sions to which they refer are disjoint. In other words, two attribute domains
are orthogonal if their elements refer to different features of a given domain.
In particular, if two attribute domains A and B are orthogonal, for every
a ∈ A and b ∈ B, a∧ b will correspond to a non-empty set in the underlying
conceptual space, which can be seen as the Cartesian product of reg(a) and
reg(b). In other words, fixing the value of an attribute does not further re-
strict the possible values of the other attributes. For example, consider the
rule large ∧ detached→ lux from Example 2. The attribute domains A2 and
A3 (corresponding to large and detached) are orthogonal to each other, but
neither is orthogonal to the attribute domain A4 (corresponding to lux). The
concept of orthogonality is closely related to the idea of logical independence.
We call a set X ⊆ D1 × ... × Dl realizable if we are guaranteed that X
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contains at least one element that corresponds to a non-empty region. If all of
the attribute domains D1, ..., Dl are orthogonal, this is simply when X 6= ∅.
In general, it may happen that some attribute domains are not orthogonal,
but that these attribute domains are irrelevant w.r.t. X. In particular, we
define a set X↓i which essentially contains the elements from X that do not
depend on the ith attribute domain:
(a1, ..., ai−1, ai+1, ..., al) ∈ X
↓i iff ∀x ∈ Di . (a1, ..., ai−1, x, ai+1, ..., al) ∈ X
(22)
Now we can recursively define the notion of realizability. In particular, we say
that X is realizable if (i) all attribute domains underlying X are orthogonal
and X 6= ∅ or (ii) there exists an i such that X↓i is realizable.
In this section, we will first analyze how conceptual relations can be de-
fined between subsets of D1 × ... ×Dl. In Sections 5.1 and 5.2 we will look
at betweenness and parallelism, before also taking comparative distance into
account in Section 5.3. Finally, in Section 5.4, we will show how these re-
lations can be used to refine the function fR, using the postulates (bet1),
(bet2), (par1) and (par2) that were introduced in Section 4.3. Through-
out the section, we will assume that the relations bet, bet, par and par are
completely specified on the level of individual labels.
5.1. Betweenness
As explained in Section 4, our approach will start from available qualita-
tive knowledge about the conceptual spaces underlying the attribute domains
A1, ..., An. For three labels x, y, z ∈ Ai, we may know for example that y is
fully between x and z, i.e. bet(reg(x), reg(y), reg(z)) holds, or that y is par-
tially between x and z, i.e. bet(reg(x), reg(y), reg(z)) holds. Such betweenness
information is sufficient for interpolative reasoning in situations where the
antecedent of each rule consists of a single atom, taken from some fixed at-
tribute domain B, and where the consequent of each rule consists of a single
atom, taken from some fixed attribute domain C. To handle general rule
bases, however, we need to lift the betweenness information we have about
labels (i.e. atoms) to betweenness information about complex formulas. At
the semantic level this means that we need information about the between-
ness of subsets of Cartesian products D1 × ... × Dl of attribute domains.
Indeed, each element of D1 × ...×Dl corresponds to a conjunction of atoms
at the syntactic level, hence subsets of D1 × ...×Dl correspond to arbitrary
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formulas. Note that each subset of D1 × ... × Dl indeed corresponds to a
region in some underlying conceptual space D.
First we focus on characterizing betweenness for elements of D1 × ... ×
Dl. A central observation is that betweenness for a vector of labels cannot
be reduced to betweenness for the labels in the respective components. In
particular, notice that when bet(a1, b1, c1) and bet(a2, b2, c2) hold, we do not
necessarily have that (b1, b2) is between (a1, a2) and (c1, c2). Indeed, even
for points in a Euclidean space of dimension two or more, betweenness in
each dimension does not entail collinearity. Here the intuition of bet and
bet as upper and lower approximations of betweenness becomes important.
In particular, while betweenness in each component is not sufficient, it is a
necessary condition, hence the upper approximation of betweenness can still
be defined as:
bet(a,b, c) iff ∀j . bet(aj, bj, cj)
where we write e.g. ai for the i
th component of vector a. To extend bet to
vectors of labels, first note that when the attribute domains D1, ..., Dl are
not orthogonal, we cannot provide any non-trivial guarantees as nothing is
between the regions corresponding to a and c when one of these regions is
empty. Hence bet(a,b, c) is false unless a = b = c. On the other hand, if
the attribute domains D1, ..., Dl are all orthogonal, we define:
bet(a,b, c) iff (a = b) ∨ (b = c) (23)
∨
(
∃j . (∀i 6= j . ai = bi = ci) ∧ bet(aj, bj, cj)
)
Indeed, in the cases where a = b or b = c, we trivially have that bet(a,b, c)
holds due to the fact that bet(p, p, q) holds for all points p and q. However,
note that even in these trivial cases, we still need to require the orthogonality
of the attribute domains D1, ..., Dl. In the case where a = b = c, on the
other hand, we do have that bet(a,b, c) is trivially satisfied, even if all three
regions are empty (as can easily be seen from the definition in (16)). The
last disjunct in the right-hand side of (23) covers the general case, where we
can only guarantee betweenness for a vector of labels if the vectors coincide
in all but one component.
Example 12. The quality dimensions underlying attribute domains A1 and
A2 from Example 2 clearly overlap. For example, it is not possible for a
bungalow to also be an apartment, or for a loft to be a row-house. On the
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other hand, we may consider that attribute domains A2 and A3 are orthogo-
nal. Note that this orthogonality holds irrespective of whether there actually
exist apartments that are very-large. What is important is that nothing in
the definition of an apartment prevents it from possibly being very-large. As
a result, we can derive e.g. that
bet
(
(apartment, small), (apartment, large), (apartment, very-large)
)
holds but not e.g.
bet
(
(bungalow, detached), (bungalow, semi-detached), (bungalow, row-house)
)
Now we move to betweenness of subsets of D1 × ... × Dl. In particular,
we will define sets bet(X1, X2) and bet(X1, X2) containing respectively those
elements from D1×...×Dl that are possibly partially between elements of X1
and elements of X2, and those elements that are guaranteed to be completely
between elements of X1 and elements of X2. For bet this is straightforward:
bet(X1, X2) ={b | a ∈ X1, c ∈ X2, bet(a,b, c)} (24)
The following proposition shows that this definition is indeed correct in the
sense that it is compatible with the geometric notion of betweenness:
Proposition 2. Let X1, X2 and Y be subsets of D1× ...×Dl. We have that
bet(reg(X1), reg(Y ), reg(X2))⇒ Y ∩ bet(X1, X2) 6= ∅
Note that we are slightly abusing notation here, writing bet both for a pred-
icate which takes three regions as argument (as defined in (15)), and for a
set which takes two subsets of D1× ...×Dl as argument (as defined in (24)).
To define bet, the realizability of the arguments X1 and X2 again comes
into play. We define:
bet(X1, X2) =Z ∪ {b | a ∈ X1, c ∈ X2, bet(a,b, c)} (25)
∪
⋃
1≤i≤l
x∈Di
{(b1, ..., bi−1, x, bi+1, ..., bl) |b
(i) ∈ bet(X↓i1 , X
↓i
2 )}
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with
Z =

X1 ∪X2 if X1 and X2 are realizable
X1 if only X2 is realizable
X2 if only X1 is realizable
X1 ∩X2 otherwise
b(i) = (b1, ..., bi−1, bi+1, ..., bl)
The set Z intuitively corresponds to the trivial situations of betweenness
a = b and b = c in (23). If X1 and X2 are realizable, this means that all
elements from X1 and X2 should be considered to be between X1 and X2. If
X2 is realizable but not X1, we know that X2 corresponds to a non-empty
region in the corresponding conceptual space. The set X1, on the other hand,
may or may not correspond to a non-empty region, the lack of realizability
merely means that we can not guarantee that reg(X1) 6= ∅. In such a case,
we cannot guarantee that the elements of X2 are between X1 and X2 as this
depends on whether or not X1 corresponds to an empty region. However, it is
not hard to see from (16) that bet(reg(X1), reg(X1), reg(X2)) holds regardless
of whether reg(X1) = ∅. The case where only X1 is realizable is similar.
If neither of X1 and X2 are realizable, betweenness can only be guaranteed
for elements in X1 ∩ X2, noting that reg(X1 ∩ X2) = ∅ as soon as one of
reg(X1) = ∅ or reg(X2) = ∅ holds.
The second component in the right-hand side of (25) expresses that b is in
bet(X1, X2) if it is between some element from X1 and some element from X2.
The third component is needed to correctly address the case where some of
the attribute domains D1, ..., Dl are not orthogonal (in which case the second
component is the empty set). In such a case, we will only find elements that
are guaranteed to be between X1 and X2 if the attribute domains which
are not orthogonal to the others are in some sense irrelevant. The following
proposition shows the correctness of the definition of bet in (25).
Proposition 3. Let X1, X2 and Y be subsets of D1× ...×Dl. We have that
Y ⊆ bet(X1, X2)⇒ bet(reg(X1), reg(Y ), reg(X2))
Example 13. Let X1 = {(x, det, small) |x ∈ A1} and X2 = {(x, det, large) |x ∈
A1}, and assume that A2 and A3 are orthogonal (considering that the size of
a house is irrelevant in deciding whether it is e.g. detached or not), while A1
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and A2 are not. Noting that
bet({(det, small)}, {(det, large)}) = {(det, small), (det,medium), (det, large)}
we find bet(X1, X2) = {(x, det, y) |x ∈ A1, y ∈ {small,medium, large}}
5.2. Parallelism
The treatment of parallelism is largely analogous to the treatment of be-
tweenness. If the attribute domains D1, ..., Dl are all orthogonal, the relation
par can be defined for elements of D1 × ...×Dl as follows:
par(a,b, c;d) iff (a = c ∧ b = d) ∨ (c = d) (26)
∨ (∃j . (∀i 6= j . (ai = bi) ∧ (ci = di)) ∧ par(aj, bj, cj; dj))
As for betweenness, we find that a component-wise assessment of parallelism
is not usually sufficient to provide guarantees on the parallelism of the vec-
tors. The exceptions covered by the definition of par are the trivial case
where a = c and b = d, the trivial case where c = d, and the case where
the transition from a to b, and from c to d only affects one component.
If the attribute domains D1, ..., Dl are not orthogonal, we cannot guarantee
anything about the parallelism of elements from D1 × ...×Dl, unless in the
entirely trivial case where a = b = c = d.
For any Cartesian product D1 × ... × Dl of attribute domains, par is
defined as
par(a,b, c;d) iff ∀j . par(aj, bj, cj; dj)
To assess parallelism w.r.t. subsets X1, X2 and X3 of D1× ...×Dl, we define:
par(X1, X2, X3) = Z2 ∪ Z3 ∪ {d | a ∈ X1,b ∈ X2, c ∈ X3, par(a,b, c;d)}
∪ {(d1, ..., di−1, x, di+1, ..., dl) |d ∈ par(X
↓i
1 , X
↓i
2 , X
↓i
3 ), 1 ≤ i ≤ l, x ∈ Di}
∪ {(d1, ..., di−1, x, di+1, ..., dl) |d ∈ par(X
↓x
1 , X
↓y
2 , X
↓y
3 ), 1 ≤ i ≤ l, x, y ∈ Di,
Di orthogonal to D1, ..., Di−1, Di+1, ..., Dl}
(27)
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with
Z2 =
{
X2 if X1 ∩X3 is realizable
X1 ∩X2 ∩X3 otherwise
Z3 =

X3 if X1 and X2 are realizable
X2 ∩X3 if X1 is realizable but not X2
X1 ∩X3 if X2 is realizable but not X1
X1 ∩X2 ∩X3 otherwise
and for y ∈ Di and X ⊆ D1 × ...×Dl we define
(a1, ..., ai−1, ai+1, ..., al) ∈ X
↓y iff (a1, ..., ai−1, y, ai+1, ..., al) ∈ X
The set Z2 corresponds to those elements that can be added to par(X1, X2, X3)
due to the trivial case where a = c ∧ b = d in (26), whereas Z3 corresponds
to the trivial case where c = d. In particular, if X1∩X3 is realizable we know
that for every point in X2 we can find a point which belongs to both X1 and
X3, hence (X1∩X3, X2, X1∩X3, X2) trivially defines two parallel directions,
hence so does (X1, X2, X3, X2). The definition of Z3 is based on the intuition
that (X1, X2, X3, X3) trivially defines two parallel directions, but only if X1,
X2 and X3 correspond to non-empty regions. As in the case of the set Z in
the definition of bet, we need to take realizability into account. The third
argument of the union in the right-hand-side of (27) expresses the basic case:
d is in par(X1, X2, X3) if there are elements in X1, X2 and X3 such that
the corresponding directions are parallel. The fourth argument allows us to
ignore irrelevant attribute domains, similar as in the definition of bet in (25).
For parallelism, however, there is another case where situations of parallism
in D1 × ...×Di−1 ×Di+1 × ...×Dl may be extended to D1 × ...×Dl, which
is covered by the last argument of the union. The central idea is that when
Di is orthogonal to the other attribute domains, we can be more tolerant;
note that X↓i2 ×X
↓i
3 ⊆
⋃
y∈Di
X↓y2 ×X
↓y
3 . Indeed, all that is required is that
we can extend vectors a, b, c and d in D1 × ...×Di−1 ×Di+1 × ...×Dl, by
choosing the same value x from Di to extend a and b and the same value y
to extend c and d, without there being a requirement for x = y to hold.
On the other hand, regardless of the realizability of X1, X2 and X3, we
always define:
par(X1, X2, X3) ={d | a ∈ X1,b ∈ X2, c ∈ X3, par(a,b, c,d)}
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The correctness of the proposed definitions is demonstrated by the following
propositions.
Proposition 4. Let X1, X2, X3 and Y be subsets of D1× ...×Dl. We have
that
Y ⊆ par(X1, X2, X3)⇒ par(reg(X1), reg(X2), reg(X3); reg(Y ))
Proposition 5. Let X1, X2, X3 and Y be subsets of D1× ...×Dl. We have
that
par(reg(X1), reg(X2), reg(X3); reg(Y ))⇒ Y ∩ par(X1, X2, X3) 6= ∅
5.3. Comparative distance
The relations betσ, betσ, parτ and parτ behave in general similar to their
counterparts bet, bet, par and par. The main exception is when σ = [λ, λ]
or τ = [µ, µ] is a degenerate interval, i.e. a singleton, in which case betσ and
parτ hold as soon as these relations hold for each of the components, i.e. we
have for each λ ∈ [0, 1] and µ ∈ [0,+∞[ that
bet[λ,λ](a,b, c) iff ∀i . bet[λ,λ](ai, bi, ci)
par[µ,µ](a,b, c;d) iff ∀i . par[µ,µ](ai, bi, ci; di)
provided that the attribute domains D1, ..., Dl are orthogonal; otherwise, we
still cannot provide any guarantees on betweenness or parallelism beyond
the trivial cases where a = b = c and a = b = c = d respectively. The
underlying reason that the definition of betσ becomes more tolerant when
σ is a singleton is due to the fact that for points p = (p1, p2, ..., pn), q =
(q1, q2, ..., qn), r = (r1, r2, ..., rn) in a Euclidean space, it holds that whenever
we have qi = pi+ λ(ri− pi) for all i, we also have
−→pq = λ · −→pr; and similar for
parτ .
If σ and τ are not singletons, betσ and parτ are defined as:
betσ(a,b, c) iff α1 ∨ α2 ∨ (a = b = c)
∨
(
∃j . (∀i 6= j . ai = bi = ci) ∧ betσ(aj, bj, cj)
)
parτ (a,b, c;d) iff β1 ∨ β2 ∨ ((a = b) ∧ (c = d))
∨ (∃j . (∀i 6= j . (ai = bi) ∧ (ci = di)) ∧ parτ (aj, bj, cj; dj))
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with
α1 ≡
{
a = b if 0 ∈ σ
⊥ otherwise
α2 ≡
{
b = c if 1 ∈ σ
⊥ otherwise
β1 ≡
{
(a = c) ∧ (b = d) if 1 ∈ τ
⊥ otherwise
β2 ≡
{
c = d if 0 ∈ τ
⊥ otherwise
and where again we assume thatD1, ..., Dl are orthogonal. Note that betσ and
parτ are essentially defined as bet and par when σ and τ are not singletons,
although some of the trivial cases only hold when they contain 0 or 1.
Moreover, in all cases betσ and parτ are defined like bet and par:
betσ(a,b, c) iff ∀j . betσ(aj, bj, cj)
parτ (a,b, c;d) iff ∀j . parτ (aj, bj, cj; dj)
Now we extend these relations to subsets of D1× ...×Dl. Let X1 and X2 be
subsets of D1 × ...×Dl; we define
betσ(X1, X2) = Z1 ∪ Z2 ∪ {b | a ∈ X1, c ∈ X2, betσ(a,b, c)}
∪ {(b1, ..., bi−1, x, bi+1, ..., bl) |b ∈ betσ(X
↓i
1 , X
↓i
2 ), 1 ≤ i ≤ l, x ∈ Di}
(28)
with
Z1 =
{
X1 if X2 is realizable and 0 ∈ σ
X1 ∩X2 otherwise
Z2 =
{
X2 if X1 is realizable and 1 ∈ σ
X1 ∩X2 otherwise
The situation for parτ is mostly similar as for par:
parτ (X1, X2, X3) = Z2 ∪ Z3 ∪ {d | a ∈ X1,b ∈ X2, c ∈ X3, parτ (a,b, c;d)}
∪ {(d1, ..., di−1, x, di+1, ..., dl) |d ∈ parτ (X
↓i
1 , X
↓i
2 , X
↓i
3 ), 1 ≤ i ≤ l, x ∈ Di}
∪ {(d1, ..., di−1, x, di+1, ..., dl) |d ∈ parτ (X
↓x
1 , X
↓y
2 , X
↓y
3 ), 1 ≤ i ≤ l, x, y ∈ Di,
Di orthogonal to D1, ..., Di−1, Di+1, ..., Dl}
(29)
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with
Z2 =
{
X2 if X1 ∩X3 is realizable and 1 ∈ τ
X1 ∩X2 ∩X3 otherwise
Z3 =

X3 if X1 and X2 are realizable and 0 ∈ τ
or if X1 ∩X2 is realizable
X2 ∩X3 if X1 is realizable but not X2 and 0 ∈ τ
X1 ∩X3 if X2 is realizable but not X1 and 0 ∈ τ
X1 ∩X2 ∩X3 otherwise
Proposition 6. Let X1, X2, X3, and Y be subsets of D1 × ...×Dl, let σ be
a subset of [0, 1] and τ a subset of [0,+∞[. We have that
Y ⊆ betσ(X1, X2)⇒ betσ(reg(X1), reg(Y ), reg(X2))
Y ⊆ parτ (X1, X2, X3)⇒ parτ (reg(X1), reg(X2), reg(X3); reg(Y ))
Proposition 7. Let X1, X2, X3, and Y be subsets of D1 × ...×Dl, let σ be
a subset of [0, 1] and τ a subset of [0,+∞[. We have that
betσ(reg(X1), reg(Y ), reg(X2))⇒ Y ∩ betσ(X1, X2) 6= ∅
parτ (reg(X1), reg(X2), reg(X3); reg(Y ))⇒ Y ∩ parτ (X1, X2, X3) 6= ∅
5.4. Refining the rule base
From Postulates (bet1), (bet2), (par1) and (par2), we know that for
all regions A1, A2, A3 in B, it holds that:
m∗(betσ(A1, A2)) ⊆ betσ(m
∗(A1),m
∗(A2)) (30)
m∗(parσ(A1, A2, A3)) ⊆ parσ(m
∗(A1),m
∗(A2),m
∗(A3)) (31)
where m∗ is the pointwise extension of m as before, and (σ ⊆ [0, 1], τ ⊆
[0,+∞[)
betσ(A1, A2) = {q | ∃p ∈ A1, r ∈ A2, λ ∈ σ . bet(p, q, r) ∧
−→pq = λ · −→pr}
parτ (A1, A2, A3) = {s | ∃p ∈ A1, q ∈ A2, r ∈ A3, λ ∈ τ .
−→rs = λ · −→pq}
In other words, we have that betσ(A1, A2) is the true set of points that are
located between A1 and A2 with a relative distance from A1 contained in σ,
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and similar for parτ (A1, A2, A3). In particular, we have that
betσ(A1, A2) ⊆ betσ(A1, A2) (32)
betσ(m
∗(A1),m
∗(A2)) ⊆ betσ(m
∗(A1),m
∗(A2)) (33)
parτ (A1, A2, A3) ⊆ parτ (A1, A2, A3) (34)
parτ (m
∗(A1),m
∗(A2),m
∗(A3)) ⊆ parτ (m
∗(A1),m
∗(A2),m
∗(A3)) (35)
Together with (30)–(31) and the monotonicity of f̂ w.r.t. set inclusion, this
yields
f̂(betσ(X1, X2)) ⊆ betσ(f̂(X1), f̂(X2)) (36)
f̂(parτ (X1, X2, X3)) ⊆ parτ (f̂(X1), f̂(X2), f̂(X3)) (37)
for all X1, X2, X3 ∈ 2
B.
Recall that the mapping f̂ is unknown to us, and corresponds to the
semantic counterpart of the ‘ideal’ rule base, containing all knowledge about
m that can be encoded using the given vocabulary. However, given that
f̂ ≤ fR is assumed to hold (i.e. all knowledge encoded in R is correct), (36)
and (37) allow us to refine the mapping fR, which is at our disposal, to the
most conservative refinement f̂R that satisfies these two constraints, i.e. we
define f̂R to be the largest fixpoint, w.r.t. the ordering ≤ defined in (14), of
f̂R({x})=fR({x}) ∩
⋂
σ⊆[0,1]
{betσ(f̂R(Y ), f̂R(Z))|x∈ betσ(Y, Z)}
∩
⋂
τ⊆[0,+∞[
{parτ (f̂R(X), f̂R(Y ), f̂R(Z))|x∈ parτ (X, Y, Z)}
and f̂R(X) =
⋃
x∈X f̂R({x}). From the well-known Knaster-Tarski theorem
[52], we know that this largest fixpoint exists, and can be found in an iterative
way as follows. Let f̂R
(0)
= fR and
f̂R
(i+1)
({x})=fR({x}) ∩
⋂
σ⊆[0,1]
{betσ(f̂R
(i)
(Y ), f̂R
(i)
(Z))|x∈ betσ(Y, Z)} (38)
∩
⋂
τ⊆[0,+∞[
{parτ (f̂R
(i)
(X), f̂R
(i)
(Y ), f̂R
(i)
(Z))|x∈ parτ (X, Y, Z)}
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and f̂R
(i+1)
(X) =
⋃
x∈X f̂R
(i+1)
({x}). It is clear that f̂R
(i+1)
≤ f̂R
(i)
, i.e. this
definition allows us to repeatedly refine the initial function f̂R
(0)
. From the
finiteness of the attribute domains B and C, it follows that this process must
end, i.e. that there is an i0 ∈ N such that f̂R
(i0+1)
= f̂R
(i0)
= f̂R.
Proposition 8. Let fR, f̂ and f̂R be defined as before. It holds that
f̂R ≤ fR
Moreover, if R is compatible with m in the sense of (21), it follows from
Postulates (bet1), (bet2), (par1) and (par2) that
f̂ ≤ f̂R
Example 14. Let us again consider the rules from Example 2, and let us
determine the comfort level of a medium-sized detached villa:
f̂R({(villa, det,med)})
⊆ f̂R(bet(X1, X2))
⊆ bet(f̂R(X1), f̂R(X2))
⊆ bet(fR(X1), fR(X2))
= bet({(det, small, bas), (det, small, comf)}, {(det, large, lux)})
= {(det, x, y) |x ∈ {small,med, large}, y ∈ {bas, comf, lux}}
where X1 and X2 are as defined in Example 13. Furthermore, we also have
f̂R({(villa, det,med)}) ⊆ fR({(villa, det,med)}) = {(det,med, x) |x ∈ A4}
Together we thus find
f̂R({(villa, det,med)}) ⊆ {(det,med, bas), (det,med, comf), (det,med, lux)}
6. Syntactic characterization
In this section, we will analyze how conceptual relations behave at the
syntactic level, i.e. how available background information on betweenness and
parallelism of atoms can be lifted to relations between arbitrary propositional
formulas. Together with the meta-principles (S), (I), (I’), (E), (E’) and
50
(D) introduced in Section 3.1, we will then be able to fully characterize a
commonsense inference relation, and show its soundness and completeness
w.r.t. the semantics from Section 5.
As elements from A can be identified with interpretations, any proposi-
tional formula α naturally corresponds to a set set(α) of elements S from
A, which are the elements that correspond to the models of α, i.e. set(α) =
{ω ∈ A |ω |=A α}. Conversely, every element a = (a1, ..., an) from A cor-
responds to an interpretation, which can syntactically be characterized as a
conjunction of atoms a1 ∧ ... ∧ an; let us write conj(a) for the conjunction
corresponding to a ∈ A.
As input to the inference relation, in addition to the rule base R, we
assume that a set of assertions Σ is given, which specifies the conceptual
relations at the atom level. We define the closure Σ∗ of Σ to be the (infinite)
set of all assertions that directly follow from assertions in Σ. In particular,
we define Σ∗ as the smallest set of assertions which satisfies Σ ⊆ Σ∗, and
moreover for all a, b, c, and d:
betσ(a, b, c) ∈ Σ
∗ ⇒ bet1−σ(c, b, a) ∈ Σ
∗
betσ(a, b, c) ∈ Σ
∗ ⇒ bet1−σ(c, b, a) ∈ Σ
∗
betσ(a, b, c) ∈ Σ
∗ ∧ σ ⊆ σ′ ⇒ betσ′(c, b, a) ∈ Σ
∗
betσ(a, b, c) ∈ Σ
∗ ∧ σ ⊆ σ′ ⇒ betσ′(c, b, a) ∈ Σ
∗
parτ (a, b, c; d) ∈ Σ
∗ ∧ τ ⊆ τ ′ ⇒ parτ ′(a, b, c; d) ∈ Σ
∗
parτ (a, b, c; d) ∈ Σ
∗ ∧ τ ⊆ τ ′ ⇒ parτ ′(a, b, c; d) ∈ Σ
∗
betσ(a, a, c) ∈ Σ
∗ ⇒ betσ(a, a, c) ∈ Σ
∗
parτ (a, b, c; d) ∈ Σ
∗ ⇒ parτ (a, b, c; d) ∈ Σ
∗
0 ∈ σ ⇒ betσ(a, a, c) ∈ Σ
∗
σ 6= ∅ ⇒ betσ(a, a, a) ∈ Σ
∗
1 ∈ τ ⇒ parτ (a, b, a; b) ∈ Σ
∗
0 ∈ τ ⇒ parτ (a, b, c; c) ∈ Σ
∗
τ 6= ∅ ⇒ parτ (a, a, b; b) ∈ Σ
∗
where we write 1− σ for the set {1− x |x ∈ σ}. Note that even though the
set Σ∗ is infinite, it is straightforward to decide whether a given assertion
such as betσ(a, b, c) is in Σ
∗ from the definition of Σ. In the following, we will
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use the assumption that the assertions in Σ are sound in the following sense:
betσ(a, b, c) ∈ Σ ⇒ betσ(reg(a), reg(b), reg(c)) (39)
betσ(reg(a), reg(b), reg(c)) ⇒ betσ(a, b, c) ∈ Σ
∗ (40)
parτ (a, b, c; d) ∈ Σ ⇒ parτ (reg(a), reg(b), reg(c); reg(d)) (41)
parτ (reg(a), reg(b), reg(c); reg(d)) ⇒ parτ (a, b, c; d) ∈ Σ
∗ (42)
for all labels a, b, c, d from the same attribute domain Ai. In addition, the
following assumptions are needed to show completeness, although they can
be abandoned when completeness is not required (or feasible):
betσ(reg(a), reg(b), reg(c)) ⇒ betσ(a, b, c) ∈ Σ
∗ (43)
betσ(a, b, c) ∈ Σ ⇒ betσ(reg(a), reg(b), reg(c)) (44)
parτ (reg(a), reg(b), reg(c); reg(d)) ⇒ parτ (a, b, c; d) ∈ Σ
∗ (45)
parτ (a, b, c; d) ∈ Σ ⇒ parτ (reg(a), reg(b), reg(c); reg(d)) (46)
In the following, we do not explicitly consider bet, par, bet and par, see-
ing these relations merely as abbreviations for bet[0,1], par[0,+∞[, bet[0,1] and
par[0,+∞[.
Before we can characterize the conceptual relations, we need a syntactic
counterpart for the notion of realizability, which played a key role in Section
5. As it turns out, at the syntactic level, realizability corresponds to a strong
notion of consistency. More precisely, a formula α is called consistent if it
has at least one model. Given a formula α, let us write domains(α) for the
set of attribute domains to which α refers, i.e. for each atom a occurring
in α, the attribute domain Ai which contains a will be in domains(α). We
then say that α is strongly consistent if there exists a consistent formula β
such that β |= α and all attribute domains in domains(α) are orthogonal
to each other. The correspondence with realizability is demonstrated by the
following lemma.
Lemma 1. It holds that a formula α is strongly consistent iff set(α) is real-
izable.
To formalize what can be inferred from Σ, we again follow a normative
approach. In particular, we consider that an expression of the form α →
β ⋊⋉σ γ is supported by Σ if it can be derived using the following rules.
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(bet1) If betσ(a, x, b) ∈ Σ then Σ ⊢ x→ a⋊⋉σ b.
(bet2) If α2 |=A α1, β1 |=A β2, γ1 |=A γ2 and σ1 ⊆ σ2, then whenever we
have Σ ⊢ α1 → β1 ⋊⋉σ1 γ1 we also have Σ ⊢ α2 → β2 ⋊⋉σ2 γ2.
(bet3) If Σ ⊢ α→ β ⋊⋉σ γ then Σ ⊢ α→ γ ⋊⋉(1−σ)β.
(bet4) If β is strongly consistent and 0 ∈ σ, we have Σ ⊢ α→ α⋊⋉σ β.
(bet5) It always
7 holds that Σ ⊢ α→ α⋊⋉σα.
(bet6) If Σ ⊢ α1 → β1 ⋊⋉σ γ1 and Σ ⊢ α2 → β2 ⋊⋉σ γ2 then Σ ⊢ α1 ∨ α2 →
(β1 ∨ β2)⋊⋉σ (γ1 ∨ γ2).
(bet7) If Σ ⊢ α→ β ⋊⋉σ γ, δ is strongly consistent and the attribute domains
in domains(α) ∪ domains(β) ∪ domains(γ) are orthogonal to those in
domains(δ), then Σ ⊢ α ∧ δ → (β ∧ δ)⋊⋉σ (γ ∧ δ).
(bet8) If Σ ⊢ α1 → β1 ⋊⋉[λ,λ] γ1, Σ ⊢ α2 → β2 ⋊⋉[λ,λ] γ2 and the attribute
domains in domains(α1)∪domains(β1)∪domains(γ1) are orthogonal to
those in domains(α2)∪domains(β2)∪domains(γ2), then Σ ⊢ α1∧α2 →
(β1 ∧ β2)⋊⋉[λ,λ] (γ1 ∧ γ2).
(bet9) It holds that Σ ⊢ ⊥ → β ⋊⋉σ γ.
where we write 1− σ as a shorthand for {1− λ |λ ∈ σ}. The soundness and
completeness of these inference rules w.r.t. the semantics from Section 5 is
shown by the following proposition.
Proposition 9. Assume that Σ satisfies (39) and (43). It holds that Σ ⊢
α→ β ⋊⋉σ γ can be derived from the inference rules (bet1)–(bet9) iff set(α) ⊆
betσ(set(β), set(γ)).
If Σ only satisfies (39) we still have that whenever Σ ⊢ α → β ⋊⋉σ γ can
be derived, we also have set(α) ⊆ betσ(set(β), set(γ)), i.e. inference is still
sound. Conversely, to show that Σ ⊢ α → β ⋊⋉σ γ can be derived whenever
set(α) ⊆ betσ(set(β), set(γ)) holds, we only need (43).
7We implicitly do assume that σ 6= ∅ however.
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Example 15. Consider the rules about wines from Example 10, and assume
that the attribute domains are given by
A1 = {beaujolais, bardolino, valpolicalla, . . . }
A2 = {inexpensive,mid-range, above-average, high-end}
A3 = {low-tannins,mid-tannins, high-tannins}
A4 = {light-body,medium-body, full-body}
A5 = {light-red,medium-red, dark-red, opaque}
The assertions in Σ about A1 are assumed to have been obtained using data-
driven techniques, as was explained in Section 4.2. The assertions about
A2, A3, A4 and A5 are obtained from the natural ranking of the labels, by
assuming that they are all represented in a uni-dimensional domain. Recall
that in uni-dimensional domains, the relations betσ and betσ coincide, as
do parσ and parσ. In the following, we will assume that A1 and A2 are
orthogonal, and that A3 and A4 are orthogonal.
Using (bet1), we find:
Σ ⊢ barbera→ chianti⋊⋉[0,1]merlot (47)
Σ ⊢ medium-body→ light-body⋊⋉[0,1] full-body (48)
and using (bet7):
Σ ⊢ (mid-tan ∧med-body)→ (mid-tan ∧ light-body)⋊⋉[0,1] (mid-tan ∧ full-body)
(49)
Next, we consider formulas of the form β ⋊⋉σ γ → α
(bet1) We always have Σ ⊢ a⋊⋉σ b→
∨
{x | betσ(a, x, b) ∈ Σ
∗}.
(bet2) If α1 |=A α2, β2 |=A β1, γ2 |=A γ1 and σ2 ⊆ σ1, then whenever we
have Σ ⊢ β1 ⋊⋉σ1 γ1 → α1 we also have Σ ⊢ β2 ⋊⋉σ2 γ2 → α2.
(bet3) If Σ ⊢ β ⋊⋉σ γ → α then Σ ⊢ γ ⋊⋉1−σ β → α.
(bet4) If Σ ⊢ β1 ⋊⋉σ γ → α1, Σ ⊢ β2 ⋊⋉σ γ → α2 then Σ ⊢ (β1 ∨ β2) ⋊⋉σ γ →
α1 ∨ α2.
(bet5) If Σ ⊢ β1 ⋊⋉σ γ1 → α1 and Σ ⊢ β2 ⋊⋉σ γ2 → α2 then Σ ⊢ (β1 ∧ β2)⋊⋉σ
(γ1 ∧ γ2)→ α1 ∧ α2.
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(bet6) It holds that Σ ⊢ ⊥⋊⋉σ γ → α.
Again we can show soundness and completeness.
Proposition 10. Assume that Σ satisfies (40) and (44). It holds that
Σ ⊢ β ⋊⋉σ γ → α can be derived from the inference rules (bet1)–(bet6)
iff betσ(set(β), set(γ)) ⊆ set(α).
Example 16. Continuing the wine example, we obtain from (bet1) that
Σ ⊢ mid-tannin⋊⋉[0,1] low-tannin→ low-tannin ∨mid-tannin (50)
Σ ⊢ mid-tannin⋊⋉[0,1]mid-tannin→ mid-tannin (51)
Σ ⊢ medium-body⋊⋉[0,1]medium-body→ medium-body (52)
Combining (50) and (51) using (bet3) and (bet4), we find
Σ ⊢ (low-tannin ∨mid-tannin)⋊⋉[0,1] low-tannin→ (low-tannin ∨mid-tannin)
(53)
Combining (52) and (53), we find
Σ ⊢ ((low-tan ∨mid-tan) ∧med-bod)⋊⋉[0,1] (low-tan ∧med-bod)
→ ((low-tan ∨mid-tan) ∧med-bod) (54)
In a similar way, we can also consider expressions of the form δ → γ⊲τ〈α, β〉:
(par
1
) If parτ (a, b, c; d) ∈ Σ then Σ ⊢ d→ c⊲τ 〈a, b〉.
(par
2
) If α1 |=A α2, β1 |=A β2, γ1 |=A γ2, δ2 |=A δ1 and τ1 ⊆ τ2, then
whenever we have Σ ⊢ δ1 → γ1 ⊲τ1 〈α1, β1〉 we also have Σ ⊢ δ2 →
γ2⊲τ2 〈α2, β2〉.
(par
3
) If α is strongly consistent and 1 ∈ τ , we always have Σ ⊢ β →
α⊲τ 〈α, β〉.
(par
4
) We always8 have that Σ ⊢ α→ α⊲τ 〈α, α〉.
(par
5
) If α is strongly consistent, we always have Σ ⊢ β → β⊲τ 〈α, α〉.
8We implicitly do assume that τ 6= ∅ however.
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(par
6
) If α and β are strongly consistent and 0 ∈ τ , we always have Σ ⊢
γ → γ⊲τ 〈α, β〉.
(par
7
) If β is strongly consistent and 0 ∈ τ , we always have Σ ⊢ α →
α⊲τ 〈α, β〉.
(par
8
) If α is strongly consistent and 0 ∈ τ , we always have Σ ⊢ β →
β⊲τ 〈α, β〉.
(par
9
) If Σ ⊢ δ1 → γ1 ⊲τ 〈α1, β1〉 and Σ ⊢ δ2 → γ2 ⊲τ 〈α2, β2〉 then Σ ⊢
δ1 ∨ δ2 → (γ1 ∨ γ2)⊲τ 〈α1 ∨ α2, β1 ∨ β2〉.
(par
10
) If Σ ⊢ δ → γ⊲τ 〈α, β〉, φ and ψ are strongly consistent, and the at-
tribute domains in domains(α)∪domains(β)∪domains(γ)∪domains(δ)
are orthogonal to those in domains(φ)∪domains(ψ), then Σ ⊢ δ∧ψ →
γ ∧ ψ⊲τ 〈α ∧ φ, β ∧ φ〉.
(par
11
) If Σ ⊢ δ1 → γ1 ⊲[λ,λ] 〈α1, β1〉, Σ ⊢ δ2 → γ2 ⊲[λ,λ] 〈α2, β2〉, and
the attribute domains in domains(α1) ∪ domains(β1) ∪ domains(γ1) ∪
domains(δ1) are orthogonal to those in domains(α2) ∪ domains(β2) ∪
domains(γ2)∪domains(δ2), then Σ ⊢ δ1∧δ2 → (γ1 ∧ γ2)⊲[λ,λ]〈α1 ∧ α2, β1 ∧ β2〉.
(par
12
) It holds that Σ ⊢ ⊥ → γ⊲τ 〈α, β〉.
Proposition 11. Assume that Σ satisfies (41) and (45). It holds that Σ ⊢
δ → γ ⊲τ 〈α, β〉 can be derived from the inference rules (par1)–(par12) iff
set(δ) ⊆ parτ (set(α), set(β), set(γ)).
Example 17. Using (par
1
), we find
Σ ⊢ bandol→ zinfandel⊲[0,+∞[〈barbera, barolo〉 (55)
Σ ⊢ high-tannins→ mid-tannins⊲[0,+∞[〈low-tannins,mid-tannins〉 (56)
Σ ⊢ full-body→ medium-body⊲[0,+∞[〈light-body,medium-body〉 (57)
Using (par
10
), we then obtain
Σ ⊢ (high-tan ∧med-bod) (58)
→ (mid-tan ∧med-bod)⊲[0,+∞[〈(low-tan ∧med-bod), (mid-tan ∧med-bod)〉
Σ ⊢ (mid-tan ∧ full-bod) (59)
→ (mid-tan ∧med-bod)⊲[0,+∞[〈(low-tan ∧ light-bod), (low-tan ∧med-bod)〉
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Finally, we specify how formulas of the form γ⊲τ 〈α, β〉 → δ can be derived:
(par1) We always have Σ ⊢ c⊲τ 〈a, b〉 →
∨
{d | parτ (a, b, c; d) ∈ Σ
∗}.
(par2) If α2 |=A α1, β2 |=A β1, γ2 |=A γ1, δ1 |=A δ2 and τ2 ⊆ τ1, then
whenever we have Σ ⊢ γ1 ⊲τ1 〈α1, β1〉 → δ1 we also have Σ ⊢ γ2 ⊲τ2
〈α2, β2〉 → δ2.
(par3) If Σ ⊢ γ ⊲τ 〈α1, β〉 → δ1 and Σ ⊢ γ ⊲τ 〈α2, β〉 → δ2 then Σ ⊢
γ⊲τ 〈α1 ∨ α2, β〉 → δ1 ∨ δ2.
(par4) If Σ ⊢ γ ⊲τ 〈α, β1〉 → δ1 and Σ ⊢ γ ⊲τ 〈α, β2〉 → δ2 then Σ ⊢
γ⊲τ 〈α, β1 ∨ β2〉 → δ1 ∨ δ2.
(par5) If Σ ⊢ γ1 ⊲τ 〈α, β〉 → δ1 and Σ ⊢ γ2 ⊲τ 〈α, β〉 → δ2 then Σ ⊢
(γ1 ∨ γ2)⊲τ 〈α, β〉 → δ1 ∨ δ2.
(par6) If Σ ⊢ γ1⊲τ〈α1, β1〉 → δ1, Σ ⊢ γ2⊲τ〈α2, β2〉 → δ2 then Σ ⊢ (γ1 ∧ γ2)⊲τ
〈α1 ∧ α2, β1 ∧ β2〉 → δ1 ∧ δ2.
(par7) It holds that Σ ⊢ ⊥⊲τ 〈α, β〉 → δ.
(par8) It holds that Σ ⊢ γ⊲τ 〈⊥, β〉 → δ.
(par9) It holds that Σ ⊢ γ⊲τ 〈α,⊥〉 → δ.
Proposition 12. Assume that Σ satisfies (42) and (46). It holds that Σ ⊢
γ ⊲τ 〈α, β〉 → δ can be derived from the inference rules (par1)–(par9) iff
parτ (set(α), set(β), set(γ)) ⊆ set(α).
Example 18. Using (par1), we find
Σ ⊢ mid-tan⊲[0,+∞[〈low-tan, high-tan〉 → (mid-tan ∨ high-tan)
Σ ⊢ high-tan⊲[0,+∞[〈low-tan, high-tan〉 → high-tan
Combining these two assertions using (par5) this yields
Σ ⊢ (mid-tan ∨ high-tan)⊲[0,+∞[〈low-tan, high-tan〉 → (mid-tan ∨ high-tan)
(60)
In entirely the same fashion, we arrive at
Σ ⊢ (mid-tan ∨ high-tan)⊲[0,+∞[〈mid-tan, high-tan〉 → (mid-tan ∨ high-tan)
(61)
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Combining (60) and (61) using (par3) gives us
Σ ⊢ (mid-tan ∨ high-tan)⊲[0,+∞[〈low-tan ∨mid-tan, high-tan〉
→ (mid-tan ∨ high-tan) (62)
Furthermore, we find using (par1):
Σ ⊢ med-bod⊲[0,+∞[〈med-bod, full-bod〉 → (med-bod ∨ full-bod)
Σ ⊢ full-bod⊲[0,+∞[〈med-bod, full-bod〉 → full-bod
which we can combine using (par5) to obtain:
Σ ⊢ (med-bod ∨ full-bod)⊲[0,+∞[〈med-bod, full-bod〉 → (med-bod ∨ full-bod)
(63)
We can then combine (62) and (63) using (par6) to conclude
Σ ⊢ ((mt ∨ ht) ∧ (mb ∨ fb))⊲[0,+∞[〈((lt ∨mt) ∧mb), (ht ∧ fb)〉
→ ((mt ∨ ht) ∧ (mb ∨ fb)) (64)
where we have further abbreviated the labels. Using (par1) we also find
Σ ⊢ dark-red⊲[0,+∞[〈light-red,medium-red〉 → (dark-red ∨ opaque)
Σ ⊢ opaque⊲[0,+∞[〈light-red,medium-red〉 → opaque
Σ ⊢ dark-red⊲[0,+∞[〈medium-red, dark-red〉 → (dark-red ∨ opaque)
Σ ⊢ opaque⊲[0,+∞[〈medium-red, dark-red〉 → ∨opaque
Σ ⊢ dark-red⊲[0,+∞[〈medium-red, opaque〉 → (dark-red ∨ opaque)
Σ ⊢ opaque⊲[0,+∞[〈medium-red, opaque〉 → opaque
Applying (par5) this leads to
Σ ⊢ (dark-red ∨ op)⊲[0,+∞[〈light-red,med-red〉 → (dark-red ∨ op) (65)
Σ ⊢ (dark-red ∨ op)⊲[0,+∞[〈med-red, dark-red〉 → (dark-red ∨ op) (66)
Σ ⊢ (dark-red ∨ op)⊲[0,+∞[〈med-red, op〉 → (dark-red ∨ op) (67)
and after applying (par4), we also find
Σ ⊢ (dark-red ∨ opaque)⊲[0,+∞[〈medium-red, (dark-red ∨ opaque)〉
→ (dark-red ∨ opaque) (68)
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We are now ready to show the soundness and completeness of the inference
rules proposed in Section 3.1 w.r.t. the semantics introduced in Section 5.
Proposition 13. Let R, Σ, B and C be defined as before, and let X ⊆ B
and Y ⊆ C. It holds that
(R,Σ) ⊢
( ∨
(x1,...,xs)∈X
∧
i
xi
)
→
( ∨
(y1,...,yk)∈Y
∧
i
yi
)
can be derived from (S), (I’), (E’), (D), (bet1)–(bet9), (bet1)–(bet6),
(par
1
)–(par
12
) and (par1)–(par9) iff
f̂R(X) ⊆ Y
Example 19. We can now formalize the inference about wines from Example
10. Using (S), we find
(R,Σ) ⊢ chianti→ low-tan ∧med-body (69)
(R,Σ) ⊢ merlot→ (low-tan ∨mid-tan) ∧med-body (70)
(R,Σ) ⊢ barolo→ high-tan ∧ full-body (71)
(R,Σ) ⊢ zinfandel→ (mid-tan ∨ high-tan) ∧ (med-body ∨ full-body) (72)
(R,Σ) ⊢ low-tan ∧ light-body→ light-red (73)
(R,Σ) ⊢ low-tan ∧med-body→ med-red (74)
(R,Σ) ⊢ mid-tan ∧med-body→ dark-red ∨ opaque (75)
(R,Σ) ⊢ high-tan ∧ full-body→ opaque (76)
Combining (47), (54), (69) and (70), we find using (I’):
(R,Σ) ⊢ barbera→ (low-tan ∨mid-tan) ∧med-body (77)
If we then combine (77) with (71), (72), (55) and (64), using (E’) gives us
(R,Σ) ⊢ bandol→ ((mid-tan ∨ high-tan) ∧ (med-body ∨ full-body)) (78)
Combining (73), (74), (75), (59) and (65), we get using (E’)
(R,Σ) ⊢ mid-tan ∧ full-body→ dark-red ∨ opaque (79)
Similarly, combining (74), (75), (58) and (68)
(R,Σ) ⊢ high-tan ∧med-body→ dark-red ∨ opaque (80)
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Repeatedly applying (D) to (75), (76), (79) and (81) yields
(R,Σ) ⊢ (mid-tan ∨ high-tan) ∧ (med-body ∨ full-body)→ dark-red ∨ opaque
(81)
which together with (78), gives us
(R,Σ) ⊢ bandol→ dark-red ∨ opaque
again using (D). Despite that nothing could be concluded about bandol wine
using classical deduction, using a combination of interpolative and extrapola-
tive reasoning, we have found that its colour is either dark-red or opaque.
7. Complexity and implementation
In this section, we first show that interpolative and extrapolative rea-
soning is PSPACE-hard in general. We then show in Section 7.4 that the
complexity crucially depends on the number of attribute domains. In par-
ticular, we show that implementations in polynomial time are possible when
the number of attribute domains is small enough to be treated as a constant
(without placing any bounds on the number of attributes or the number of
rules). From this result, it also follows that the inference problem considered
in this paper is decidable in EXPTIME. However, whether this problem is
also in PSPACE remains currently open.
7.1. Hardness
We prove that interpolative and extrapolative reasoning are PSPACE-
hard, by showing a reduction from the dominance problem for CP-nets [53].
We present two such reductions, one which is only based on interpolative
reasoning and one which is only based on extrapolative reasoning.
Our terminology and notations are based on the presentation of CP-nets
in [54], where a generalization of binary CP-nets is considered. The basic
building blocks are conditional preference rules, which are expressions of the
form p : xi > ¬xi (or p : ¬xi > xi) with p a propositional formula over a set
of atoms V = {x1, ..., xn} and xi an atom from V . The intuitive meaning
is that in situations where p holds, having xi true is preferred to having xi
false. A (binary) GCP-net (generalized ceteris paribus net) over V is a set of
such conditional preference rules. An outcome is an n-tuple (I(x1), ..., I(xn))
where I maps each variable to a value from {true, false}, i.e. an outcome
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corresponds to a propositional interpretation. For the ease of presentation,
we will identify an outcome with its corresponding mapping I. Let I and J
be two outcomes, which differ only in the value of one variable xi, such that
I(xi) = true and J(xi) = false. If a GCP-net N contains a rule p : xi > ¬xi
(resp. p : ¬xi > xi) such that the propositional formula p is satisfied by both
I and J , we say that N sanctions an improving flip from J to I (resp. from
I to J). Finally, we say that I dominates J , given N , if there is a sequence
J = J0, J1, ..., Jm = I such that N sanctions an improving flip from Ji to Ji+1
for each i in {0, ...,m − 1}. The problem of deciding, given two outcomes I
and J , whether I dominates J is PSPACE-complete [54].
7.2. Reduction to interpolative reasoning
Given a GCP-net N and two outcomes I and J we now construct a rule
base R and a set of assertions Σ such that I dominates J iff a particular
rule can be derived from R using interpolative reasoning. We consider an
attribute domain Y = {y0, y1, y2}, and one additional attribute domain Xi
for each variable xi ∈ V , which is defined as
Xi = {xi, xi} ∪ {x
p
i | (p : xi > ¬xi) ∈ N} ∪ {xi
p | (p : ¬xi > xi) ∈ N}
The set of rules R is obtained by adding for each conditional preference rule
of the form p : xi > ¬xi in N the rule
p ∧ xpi → y2 (82)
and for each conditional preference rule of the form p : ¬xi > xi, we add to
R the rule
p ∧ xi
p → y2 (83)
Finally, we also add the rule∧
{xi | J(xi) = true, 1 ≤ i ≤ n} ∧
∧
{xi | J(xi) = false, 1 ≤ i ≤ n} → y1
(84)
The underlying idea is combine rules of the form (84) with rules of the form
(82) or (83) using inference rule (I’) to simulate the idea of an improving
flip. The antecedents of each of the newly generated rules will correspond to
outcomes (where a conjunct xi appears if xi is true in the outcome, and a
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conjunct xi appears otherwise). To this end, for each conditional preference
rule of the form p : xi > ¬xi we add the assertion bet[0,1](xi, xi, x
p
i ) to Σ
and for each conditional preference rule of the form p : ¬xi > xi we add the
assertion bet[0,1](xi, xi, xi
p). We also add the assertion bet[0,1](y0, y1, y2).
Proposition 14. Let I, J , N , R, and Σ be as above. It holds that I domi-
nates J , given N , iff
(R,Σ) ⊢
∧
{xi | I(xi) = true, 1 ≤ i ≤ n} ∧
∧
{xi | I(xi) = false, 1 ≤ i ≤ n} → y1 ∨ y2
(85)
7.3. Reduction to extrapolative reasoning
We now show that the idea of improving flips can also be simulated
using extrapolative reasoning, i.e. using assertions about the relations par
and par in Σ. With each variable xi we now associate an attribute do-
main Xi = {xi, xi, x
′
i, x
′
i}. We consider one additional attribute domain
Y = {y0, y1, y2, y
−, y+} whose elements will again appear in the consequent
of rules. Intuitively, y1 is the degree to which outcome J is preferred, y0 is a
lower degree of preference and y2 is a higher degree of preference. Further-
more, y− represents a lower degree of preference than y+, but the relation
between y− and y+ on the one hand, and y0, y1 and y2 on the other hand
will remain unspecified. For each conditional preference rule p : xi > ¬xi in
N , we add the following two rules to R
p ∧ x′i → y
+ p ∧ x′i → y
−
The idea here is to indicate that the direction from having xi false to having
xi true is towards more preferred outcomes when p is true. By using the
attributes x′i and x
′
i, rather than xi and xi we can talk about the effect of
changing the value of xi without the need to specify to what degree p ∧ xi
and p ∧ xi are preferred. Similarly, for each preference rule of the form
p : ¬xi > xi, we add
p ∧ x′i → y
+ p ∧ x′i → y
−
Finally, we add the rule∧
{xi | J(xi) = true, 1 ≤ i ≤ n} ∧
∧
{xi | J(xi) = false, 1 ≤ i ≤ n} → y1
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For each i, we add the assertions par[0,+∞[(x
′
i, x
′
i, xi;xi) and par[0,+∞[(x
′
i, x
′
i, xi;xi)
to Σ. In addition, we add
par[0,+∞[(y0, y1, y1; y2) par[0,+∞[(y2, y1, y1; y0)
par[0,+∞[(y
−, y+, y0; y1) par[0,+∞[(y
−, y+, y0; y2)
par[0,+∞[(y
−, y+, y1; y2) par[0,+∞[(y
+, y−, y2; y1)
par[0,+∞[(y
+, y−, y2; y0) par[0,+∞[(y
+, y−, y1; y0)
Proposition 15. Let I, J , N , R, and Σ be as above. It holds that I domi-
nates J , given N , iff
(R,Σ) ⊢
∧
{xi | I(xi) = true, 1 ≤ i ≤ n}∧
∧
{xi | I(xi) = false, 1 ≤ i ≤ n} → y1∨y2
Corollary 1. The problem of deciding whether (R,Σ) ⊢ α→ β is PSPACE-
hard, even if either all betweenness information in Σ is trivial, or all infor-
mation about parallelism in Σ is trivial.
7.4. Implementation
In propositional logic, the number of possible interpretations is exponen-
tial in the number of atoms. In the present setting, on the other hand, the
number of interpretations strongly depends on the number of attribute do-
mains. If the number of attribute domains is small compared to the total
number of atoms, the number of interpretations is essentially polynomial. For
example, if there are only two attribute domains A1 and A2, each of which
contains n
2
atoms, then there are
(
n
2
)2
interpretations. In such cases, it makes
sense to rely on implementation methods that operate at the semantic level,
even if that requires an enumeration of all interpretations.
Consider a rule base R, where the antecedents of rules are built from
the atoms in B1, ..., Bs and the consequents are built from C1, ..., Ck. From
Proposition 13, we know that we can fully characterize interpolation and
extrapolation on R by specifying the value of f̂R for each element (x1, ..., xs)
of B = B1 × ... × Bs. Moreover, from (38), we know that the function f̂R
can be obtained in an iterative fashion, although the formulation in (38)
cannot be used directly, as it involves intersections that range over arbitrary
subsets of interpretations (of which there are at least exponentially many)
and arbitrary subsets of [0, 1] and [0,+∞[. The following proposition suggests
a way to evaluate the right-hand side of (38) in practice.
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Proposition 16. Let x = (x1, ..., xs). It holds that
f̂R
(i+1)
({x}) =f̂
(i)
R ({x}) (86)
∩
⋂
{betσ(f̂R
(i)
(set(α)), f̂R
(i)
(set(γ))) | c1 ∨ c2}
∩
⋂
{parτ (f̂R
(i)
(set(α)), f̂R
(i)
(set(β)), f̂R
(i)
(set(γ))) | c3 ∨ c4}
where
c1 iff α = xi1 ∧ ... ∧ xij−1 ∧ aij ∧ xij+1 ∧ ... ∧ xir
and γ = xi1 ∧ ... ∧ xij−1 ∧ cij ∧ xij+1 ∧ ... ∧ xir
and Σ ⊢ xij → aij ⋊⋉σ cij with Bi1 , ..., Bir all orthogonal
c2 iff α = ai1 ∧ ... ∧ air and γ = ci1 ∧ ... ∧ cir
and ∃λ ∈ [0, 1] .∀j ∈ {1, ..., r} .Σ ⊢ xij → aij ⋊⋉[λ,λ] cij
with Bi1 , ..., Bir all orthogonal
c3 iff α = yi1 ∧ ... ∧ yij−1 ∧ aij ∧ yij+1 ∧ ... ∧ yir
and β = yi1 ∧ ... ∧ yij−1 ∧ bij ∧ yij+1 ∧ ... ∧ yir
and γ = xi1 ∧ ... ∧ xij−1 ∧ cij ∧ xij+1 ∧ ... ∧ xir
and Σ ⊢ xij → cij ⊲τ 〈aij , bij〉
with Bi1 , ..., Bir all orthogonal
c4 iff α = ai1 ∧ ... ∧ air and β = bi1 ∧ ... ∧ bir and γ = ci1 ∧ ... ∧ cir
and ∃µ ∈ [0,+∞[ .∀j ∈ {1, ..., r} .Σ ⊢ xij → cij ⊲[µ,µ]〈aij , bij〉
with Bi1 , ..., Bir all orthogonal
Note in particular how Proposition 16 allows us to replace the range of
the intersection over arbitrary subsets of B to a range over conjunctions α,
β and γ, of which there are polynomially many if the number of attribute
domains is treated as a constant. Moreover, note how for each choice of these
conjunctions, there is only one minimal choice for σ or τ , which can easily
be found from Σ. This leads to the following procedure to characterize the
function f̂R at the semantic level: repeat the following until f̂R
(i)
= f̂R
(i−1)
,
starting with i = 1, for each x ∈ B:
1. set S ← f̂R
(i−1)
({x});
2. for each non-empty subset {i1, ..., ir} such that Bi1 , ..., Bir are all or-
thogonal:
64
(a) for each j ∈ {1, ..., r} and for each aij and cij in Bij such that
betσ(aij , xij , cij) ∈ Σ for some σ ⊆ [0, 1]:
i. set α← xi1 ∧ ... ∧ xij−1 ∧ aij ∧ xij+1 ∧ ... ∧ xir
ii. set γ ← xi1 ∧ ... ∧ xij−1 ∧ cij ∧ xij+1 ∧ ... ∧ xir
iii. set S ← S ∩ betσ(f̂R
(i−1)
(set(α)), f̂R
(i−1)
(set(γ)))
(b) for each λ ∈ [0, 1] for which Σ contains relations of the form bet[λ,λ],
and each ai1 , ..., air , ci1 , ..., cir such that for each j it holds that
bet[λ,λ](aij , xij , cij) ∈ Σ or bet[λ,λ](cij , xij , aij) ∈ Σ or aij = xij = cij :
i. set α← ai1 ∧ ... ∧ air ;
ii. set γ ← ci1 ∧ ... ∧ cir ;
iii. set S ← S ∩ bet[λ,λ](f̂R
(i−1)
(set(α)), f̂R
(i−1)
(set(γ))) ;
(c) for each j ∈ {1, ..., r}, for each yi1 , ..., yij−1 , yij+1 , ..., yir and for
each aij , bij and cij in Bij such that parτ (aij , bij , cij ;xij) ∈ Σ for
some τ ⊆ [0,+∞[:
i. set α← yi1 ∧ ... ∧ yij−1 ∧ aij ∧ yij+1 ∧ ... ∧ yir ;
ii. set β ← yi1 ∧ ... ∧ yij−1 ∧ bij ∧ yij+1 ∧ ... ∧ yir ;
iii. set γ ← xi1 ∧ ... ∧ xij−1 ∧ cij ∧ xij+1 ∧ ... ∧ xir ;
iv. set S ← S∩parτ (f̂R
(i−1)
(set(α)), f̂R
(i−1)
(set(β)), f̂R
(i−1)
(set(γ)));
(d) for each µ ∈ [0,+∞[ for which Σ contains relations of the form
par[µ,µ], and each ai1 , ..., air , bi1 , ..., bir , ci1 , ..., cir such that for each
j it holds that par[µ,µ](aij , bij , cij ;xij) or aij = bij and cij = xij :
i. set α← ai1 ∧ ... ∧ air ;
ii. set α← bi1 ∧ ... ∧ bir ;
iii. set γ ← ci1 ∧ ... ∧ cir ;
iv. set S ← S∩par[µ,µ](f̂R
(i−1)
(set(α)), f̂R
(i−1)
(set(β)), f̂R
(i−1)
(set(γ)));
3. set f̂R
(i)
({x})← S.
Note that in step 2(a), it suffices to check whether betσ(aij , xij , cij) ∈ Σ to
verify Σ ⊢ xij → aij ⋊⋉σ cij , as all other cases where Σ ⊢ xij → aij ⋊⋉σ cij holds
are covered in one way or another. Indeed, when betσ′(aij , xij , cij) ∈ Σ, for
some σ′ ⊂ σ, we have
betσ′(f̂R
(i−1)
(set(α)), f̂R
(i−1)
(set(γ))) ⊆ betσ(f̂R
(i−1)
(set(α)), f̂R
(i−1)
(set(γ)))
so we do not need to consider betσ if we already consider betσ′ . The case
where betσ(cij , xij , aij) ∈ Σ is handled by swapping the definitions of α and
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γ. Finally, the cases where xij = aij or xij = cij do not need to be considered
because then x ∈ set(α) and 0 ∈ σ, x ∈ set(γ) and 1 ∈ σ or xij = aij =
cij ; in each of these cases we have betσ(f̂R
(i−1)
(set(α)), f̂R
(i−1)
(set(γ))) ⊆
f̂R
(i−1)
({xi}). Similar considerations apply to (b)–(d).
It is clear that each of the steps (a)–(d) is polynomial in the size of B, as
is the number of arguments x for which these steps have to be completed.
Finally, after each iteration, there is at least one element x from B for which
f̂
(i)
R ({x}) ⊂
̂
f
(i−1)
R ({x}), unless f̂
(i)
R = f̂R after which we can stop. This
means that the total number of iterations is upper bounded by B × C, and
is in particular polynomial in the size of A. This means that the above
procedure runs in polynomial time if the number of attribute domains n is
small enough to be treated as a constant. In other words, interpolative and
extrapolative reasoning is decidable in exponential time, and is polynomial
in data complexity.
Corollary 2. Let R, Σ, A1, ..., An, B1, ..., Bs and C1, ..., Ck be as before. Let
β and γ be propositional formulas such that domains(β) ⊆ {B1, ..., Bs} and
domains(γ) ⊆ {C1, ..., Ck}. The problem of deciding whether
(R,Σ) ⊢ β → γ
is in EXPTIME. If the number of attribute domains n is upper bounded by
a constant, this problem is in P.
The restriction to have a relatively small number of attribute domains is
a natural one in many application contexts. For example, interpolation is
often applied to sets of parallel if-then rules, in which case the antecedent of
every rule is built from the same attribute domains, and the consequent is
a single atom, taken from a fixed attribute domain. In such a case it is not
common to have more than a few attribute domains. As another example,
consider a rule base R = R1∪R2, such that the antecedents of rules in R1 are
built from the attribute domains B1, ..., Bk, the consequents of rules in R1 and
antecedents of rules in R2 are built from the attribute domains C1, ..., Cs, and
the consequents of rules in R2 are built from the attribute domains D1, ..., Dl,
such that {B1, ..., Bk}∩{D1, ..., Dl} = ∅. In many situations, refining R1 and
R2 separately would be equivalent to refining R as a whole. The following
counterexample, however, shows that this is not the case in general.
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Example 20. Let R = R1 ∪ R2 with R1 = {a1 → a2, c1 → c2} and R2 =
{a2 → a3, c2 → c3}, where the attribute domains are A1 = {a1, b1, c1, d1},
A2 = {a2, b2, c2, d2} and A3 = {a3, b3, c3, d3}. Assume furthermore that
Σ only contains the assertions bet[0.5,0.5](a1, b1, c1), bet[0.5,0.5](a2, b2, c2) and
bet[0.5,0.5](a3, b3, c3). Since R |= a1 → c1 and R |= a3 → c3, using (S) and
(I’), we find (R,Σ) ⊢ b1 → b3. However, using R1 only trivial information
can be derived about b1, hence refining R1 and R2 separately does not allow
us to derive anything about b1.
8. Discussion
As explained in Section 4.3, interpolative and extrapolative inference
should provide sound conclusions as long as the rule base can be seen as
the approximation of a mapping m which is linear, or in the case of interpo-
lation, monotonic. In practice, however, this assumption may not be valid, in
which case inconsistencies can be introduced by our method. In such cases,
interpolative and extrapolative reasoning could still prove useful, although it
should be applied more cautiously.
Relaxing the linearity assumption
Consider the following rules, which contain information about the amount
of traffic (light, moderate, heavy) at different times during the day:
morning→ heavy-traffic (87)
mid-day→ moderate-traffic (88)
evening→ heavy-traffic (89)
Using (I) and the assumption that
mid-day→ morning⋊⋉evening
we then derive the rule
mid-day→ heavy-traffic
which is in conflict with (88). This can be explained due to a failure of
the monotonicity assumption. In the case of (87)–(89) the underlying map-
ping is not even deterministic, in the sense that the exact amount of traffic
at e.g. 9 am may vary from day to day (even if we assume that the rule
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base talks about weekdays in a specific city). Nonetheless, even for rules
where the linearity assumption fails, interpolation may still be useful. For
instance, suppose we introduce the labels mid-morning and mid-afternoon,
which are between morning and mid-day, and between mid-day and evening
respectively. From (87) and (88) we may derive
mid-morning→ moderate-traffic ∨ heavy-traffic
Indeed, while the mapping underlying the rule base may, in principle, be
arbitrary, it seems natural to assume that more regular mappings would be
more likely, i.e. we could make the assumption that any completion of the
knowledge base should not introduce additional irregularities. In particular,
by identifying irregularities with violations of the monotonicity assumption,
this leads to the assumption that the conceptual space C1 corresponding with
the antecedent of the rules can be partitioned in a minimal number of seg-
ments, such that the mapping is monotonic over these segments. In the traffic
example, we would thus assume that the amount of traffic is monotonically
decreasing throughout the morning and monotonically increasing throughout
the afternoon. While such conclusions would not be valid in general, they are
reasonable to make in absence of any other information. Depending on how
the rule base (87)–(89) was obtained, we may also argue that the absence of
a rule for mid-morning suggests that this case is not special, i.e. that those
cases which are irregular in some sense would be more likely to be contained
in the rule base.
To avoid inconsistencies, the above view suggests that from a rule base R
we should try to identify subsets R1, ...Rk of rules, such that no inconsisten-
cies arise as long as interpolation is applied to two rules from the same set
Ri. To be compatible with the above view, we should moreover insist that
when α → α1 ⋊⋉ α2, (α1 → β1) ∈ Ri, (α2 → β2) ∈ Ri and (α → β) ∈ R,
then we should have that (α → β) ∈ Ri. In other words, the sub-bases Ri
should contain all rules that apply to a given (convex) segment of the con-
ceptual space C1. In this way, we can ensure that when a new rule α
∗ → β∗
is derived by interpolation from a sub-base Ri, the rules in Ri are indeed the
most relevant ones, i.e. that they are the ones whose antecedent is closest
to α∗ in some sense. In a similar, but slightly less cautious fashion, we may
assume that the mapping underlying the rule base R is piecewise linear, and
apply extrapolation locally to the sub-bases R1, ..., Rk.
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Restricting to the most salient properties
Another reason why inconsistencies may arise is because the information
about betweenness or analogical change is not accurate, or, more funda-
mentally, because it only takes the most salient properties of objects in the
account. For example, when we derive betweenness information for wines
from wine-food pairings, it will mainly reflect the taste of the wine, and to
a much lesser extent properties such as price. As an additional example, we
may consider that coffeehouses are conceptually between bars and restau-
rants, as both coffeehouses and bars emphasise drinking rather than eating,
while coffeehouses generally do serve some food (sandwiches, cakes) as well.
Nonetheless, we may consider that
bar→ serves-wine (90)
coffeehouse→ ¬serves-wine (91)
restaurant→ serves-wine (92)
Using interpolation and the assumption
coffeehouse→ bar⋊⋉restaurant
we derive the rule
coffeehouse→ serves-wine
which is in conflict with the rule base. In this case, the inconsistency is mainly
due the fact that the property of serving wine was not considered when as-
serting that coffeehouses are between bars and restaurants. The most natural
way to avoid inconsistencies would then be to avoid applying interpolation to
derive conclusions from the domain A = {serves-wine,¬serves-wine}. In ab-
sence of any conflicts about attributes from a given domain, we then assume
that interpolative and extrapolative conclusions are valid for that domain,
an assumption which may need to be revised if additional knowledge became
available.
9. Conclusions and future work
The aim of this paper was to study the core principles underlying inter-
polative and extrapolative reasoning about categorization rules. We have
argued that sets of categorization rules can be seen as partial specifications
of a linear mapping between conceptual spaces. This view has allowed us to
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describe interpolation and extrapolation at a purely qualitative level, relying
on qualitative spatial relations to encode knowledge about conceptual spaces
rather than on degrees of similarity. From a practical point of view, the ap-
proach is motivated from the observation that sufficient data to estimate the
conceptual relationship between labels from the same attribute domain is of-
ten available, e.g. relying on statistical techniques such as multi-dimensional
scaling or singular-value decomposition, while knowledge about how differ-
ent attribute domains are related is often sparse and is usually encoded in a
symbolic form. The techniques presented in this paper show how knowledge
about conceptual relations between labels of the same attribute domain may
be leveraged to refine whatever symbolic knowledge of this kind we have. Al-
though the general inference problem we have considered is PSPACE-hard,
we have shown that efficient implementations in polynomial time are possible
if the number of attribute domains is sufficiently small.
We may expect that the full generality of our framework would not be
needed in many applications. In [34], for instance, an approach is presented
to complete rule bases purely based on analogical proportions. The proposal
from [34] in fact corresponds to a special case of the approach presented in this
paper, where the only non-trivial information in Σ are assertions of the form
par[1,1](a, b, c; d) and par[1,1](a, b, c; d). In [34] it is moreover assumed that all
labels correspond to intervals in a uni-dimensional space, which implies that
the relations par[1,1] and par[1,1] coincide, and moreover that they exhibit a
number of symmetry and transitivity properties that are not generally valid
(e.g. par[1,1](a, b, c; d) iff par[1,1](c, d, a; b)). These simplifications lead to an
inference process which is easier to use in practice, but which is based on
assumptions that are not always realistic. By putting the approach from [34]
in relation to the approach from this paper, however, it immediately becomes
apparent when these simplifications make sense, or how the approach should
be adapted when they do not.
In contrast, some applications may require further generalizations of the
approach we have presented here. At the level of the conceptual spaces, we
have restricted ourselves to Euclidean spaces, whereas arbitrary metric spaces
might be considered instead. Moreover, a better understanding is needed of
which sets of assertions Σ are actually realizable, either in a Euclidean space
or in an arbitrary metric space. Currently, no sound and complete proce-
dures are available to check the consistency of such a set. Although this poses
no problems when conceptual relations are obtained from geometric repre-
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sentations, consistency checking procedures may be important when other
forms of acquisition are used (e.g. based on natural language processing). In
addition to betweenness and parallelism, other types of conceptual relations
may also be considered, as the same methodology may be applied to any
type of spatial relation that is invariant under linear transformations. At the
semantic level (Section 5), we have restricted ourselves to situations where
only information about conceptual relation between individual labels is avail-
able. If, however, information would be available about the betweenness or
parallelism of disjunctions of labels, a refined definition of bet and par should
be used, as e.g. reg(b) may geometrically be between reg(a1)∪ ...∪reg(ap) and
reg(c1) ∪ ... ∪ reg(cq) even if reg(b) is not between reg(ai) and reg(cj) for any
i and j. In such a case, the syntactic characterization of Section 6 should be
adapted as well. Given the presented setting, however, such a generalization
should be straightforward to formalize.
Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Let X ⊆ B and Y ⊆ C be such that
R |=A
( ∨
(x1,...,xs)∈X
s∧
i=1
xi
)
→
( ∨
(y1,...,yk)∈Y
k∧
i=1
yi
)
(A.1)
By (21) this means that
m∗
( ⋃
x∈X
reg(x)
)
⊆
⋃
y∈Y
reg(y)
and given that m∗ is a point-wise extension of the mapping m, we also have
that ⋃
x∈X
m∗
(
reg(x)
)
⊆
⋃
y∈Y
reg(y)
This means in particular that as soon as m∗(reg(x))∩ reg(y0) 6= ∅ for a given
x ∈ X and y0 ∈ C, we must have that y0 ∈ Y . In other words, we have
that f̂(X) ⊆ Y , and since this holds for every Y satisfying (A.1), we obtain
f̂(X) ⊆ fR(X).
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Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose that bet(reg(X1), reg(Y ), reg(X2)) holds. Then there are x1 ∈
reg(X1), y ∈ reg(Y ) and x2 ∈ reg(X2) such that y is between x1 and x2.
Due to the fact that the labels of each attribute domain correspond to JEPD
properties, there are (unique) elements a ∈ X1, b ∈ Y and c ∈ X2 such that
x1 ∈ reg(a), y ∈ reg(b) and x2 ∈ reg(c). To complete the proof, it suffices to
show that for every i, it holds that bet(ai, bi, ci), i.e. that there exist points
xi ∈ reg(ai), yi ∈ reg(bi), and zi ∈ reg(ci) such that yi is between xi and zi.
As betweenness is preserved under projection, the points xi, yi and zi can be
obtained from x, y and z after removing all irrelevant components.
Proof of Proposition 3
Assume that Y ⊆ bet(X1, X2). We need to show
∀q ∈ reg(Y ) .∃p ∈ reg(X1), r ∈ reg(X2) . (p = q) ∨ (∃λ ∈ [0, 1] .
−→pq = λ · −→pr)
If q ∈ X1 ∩ X2, we can simply take p = r = q. If q ∈ X1 \ X2, then X2 is
realizable and we can take p = q and an arbitrary r ∈ reg(X2) 6= ∅. Similarly,
if q ∈ X2 \X1 we can take p ∈ reg(X1) 6= ∅ arbitrary and choose r = q.
For q ∈ reg({b | a ∈ X1, c ∈ X2, bet(a,b, c)}), note that the fact that
bet(a,b, c) holds entails that the underlying attribute domains are all or-
thogonal (unless in the entirely trivial case where a = b = c). If a = b, it
suffices to take p = q and let r be an arbitrary element from reg(X2), and
similar for the case where b = c. Otherwise, the vectors a = (a1, ..., al),
b = (b1, ..., bl) and c = (c1, ..., cl) only differ in the i
th component for some
i, and we have bet(ai, bi, ci). Now, given bet(ai, bi, ci), we know that for each
qi ∈ reg(bi) there are pi ∈ reg(ai) and ri ∈ reg(ci) such that qi is between
pi and ri. As the attribute domains are orthogonal, and the vectors a, b
and c agree on all but the ith component, it is easy to see that we then also
have that for each q ∈ reg(b) there are p ∈ reg(a) and r ∈ reg(c) such that
q is between p and r; it suffices to extend pi, qi and ri by choosing identical
values for the added components.
Finally, for q ∈ reg({(b1, ..., bi−1, x, bi+1, ..., bl) |b ∈ bet(X
↓i
1 , X
↓i
2 ), 1 ≤ i ≤
l, x ∈ Di}), we know by induction that for each i and q
′ ∈ reg(Y ↓i) there
are p′ ∈ reg(X↓i1 ) and r
′ ∈ reg(X↓i2 ) such that q
′ is between p′ and r′. By
construction, we can extend q′ to a point q ∈ reg(Y ) by choosing an arbitrary
value for each of the quality dimensions underlying Di that do not already
appear in q′. In the same way, we can then extend p′ to p ∈ reg(X1) and r
′
to r ∈ reg(X2) by filling in the same values for the added quality dimensions.
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Proof of Proposition 4
Assume that Y ⊆ par(X1, X2, X3). We need to show
∀s ∈ reg(Y ) .∃p ∈ reg(X1), q ∈ reg(X2), r ∈ reg(X3) .∃λ ≥ 0 .
−→rs = λ · −→pq
If s ∈ X1 ∩ X2 ∩ X3, we can take p = q = r = s. If s ∈ (X1 ∩ X2) \ X3,
we know that X1 is realizable and thus reg(X1) 6= ∅. We can then take p
arbitrary and choose q = r = s. Similarly if s ∈ (X1 ∩ X3) \ X2, we can
choose p = r = s and take q ∈ reg(X2) 6= ∅ arbitrary. If s ∈ X3 \ (X1 ∪X2),
we know that X1 and X2 are realizable, and we can take p ∈ reg(X1) 6= ∅
and q ∈ reg(X2) 6= ∅ arbitrary, and choose r = s. If s ∈ X2 \ (X1 ∪X3), we
know that reg(X1∩X3) 6= ∅, hence we can take an arbitrary r ∈ reg(X1∩X3)
and choose p = r and q = s.
For s ∈ reg({d | a ∈ X1,b ∈ X2, c ∈ X3, par(a,b, c;d)}), note that the
fact that par(a,b, c;d) holds entails that the underlying attribute domains
are all orthogonal (with the exception of the trivial case where a = b =
c = d). If a = c and b = d, it suffices to take q = s and let p = r be an
arbitrary element from reg(a) = reg(c). If c = d, we can take r = s and let p
and q be arbitrary elements from reg(a) and reg(b) respectively. Otherwise,
we have that the vectors a = (a1, ..., al), b = (b1, ..., bl), c = (c1, ..., cl)
and d = (d1, ..., dl) are such that for some j, it holds that par(aj, bj, cj; dj),
whereas for all i 6= j we have ai = bi and ci = di. From par(aj, bj, cj; dj)
we know that there are points pj ∈ reg(aj), qj ∈ reg(bj), rj ∈ reg(cj) and
sj ∈ reg(dj) such that
−−→rjsj = λ ·
−−→pjqj for some λ ≥ 0. Given the orthogonality
of the attribute domains and the fact that ai = bi for i 6= j, pj and qj can
be extended to points p ∈ reg(a) and q ∈ reg(b) by choosing the same value
for all added components. In the same way we can extend rj and sj to
points r ∈ reg(c) and s ∈ reg(d) by choosing the same value for the added
components. We then have that −→rs = λ · −→pq, with λ as before.
For s ∈ reg({(d1, ..., di−1, x, di+1, ..., dl) |d ∈ par(X
↓i
1 , X
↓i
2 , X
↓i
3 ), 1 ≤ i ≤
l, x ∈ Di}), we know by induction that for each i and s
′ ∈ reg(Y ↓i) there
are p′ ∈ reg(X↓i1 ), q
′ ∈ reg(X↓i2 ) and r
′ ∈ reg(X↓i3 ) such that
−→
p′q′ = λ ·
−→
r′s′ for some λ > 0. By construction, we can extend s′ to a point s ∈
reg(Y ) by choosing an arbitrary value for each of the quality dimensions
underlying Di that do not already appear in s
′. In the same way, we can
then extend p′ to p ∈ reg(X1), q
′ to q ∈ reg(X2) and r
′ to r ∈ reg(X3)
by filling in the same values for the added quality dimensions. The case
where s ∈ reg({(d1, ..., di−1, x, di+1, ..., dl) |d ∈ par(X
↓x
1 , X
↓y
2 , X
↓y
3 ), 1 ≤ i ≤
73
l, x ∈ Di, y ∈ Di, Di orthogonal to D1, ..., Di−1, Di+1, ..., Dl}) is analogous,
noting that the orthogonality of Di means that none of the attribute domains
underlying Di will appear in s
′, p′, q′ and r′.
Proof of Proposition 5
Suppose that par(reg(X1), reg(X2), reg(X3); reg(Y )) holds. Then there are
x1 ∈ reg(X1), x2 ∈ reg(X2), x3 ∈ reg(X3) and y ∈ reg(Y ) such that
−→x3y =
λ · −−→x1x2 holds. Due to the fact that the labels of each attribute domain
correspond to JEPD properties, there are (unique) elements a ∈ X1, b ∈ X2,
c ∈ X3 and d ∈ Y such that x1 ∈ reg(a), x2 ∈ reg(b), x3 ∈ reg(c) and
y ∈ reg(d). To complete the proof, it suffices to show that for every i, it holds
that par(ai, bi, ci; di), i.e. that there exist points x
1
i ∈ reg(ai), x
2
i ∈ reg(bi),
x3i ∈ reg(ci) and yi ∈ reg(di) such that
−−→
x3i yi = µ ·
−−→
x1ix
2
i for some µ ≥ 0. As
parallelism is preserved under projection, the points x1i , x
2
i , x
3
i and yi can be
obtained from x1, x2, x3 and y after removing all irrelevant components, in
which case the latter equality will hold for µ = λ.
Proof of Proposition 6
The proof is largely analogous to the proof of Propositions 3 and 4, except
for the case of degenerate intervals. For that case, we need to verify that for
λ ∈ [0, 1] and µ ∈ [0,+∞[, it holds that
(∀i . bet[λ,λ](ai, bi, ci))⇒ bet[λ,λ](reg(a), reg(b), reg(c)) (A.2)
(∀i . par[µ,µ](ai, bi, ci; di))⇒ par[µ,µ](reg(a), reg(b), reg(c); reg(d)) (A.3)
provided that the underlying attribute domains D1, ..., Dl are all orthogonal.
To show (A.2), suppose that bet[λ,λ](ai, bi, ci)) for all i. This means that for
every qi ∈ reg(bi), there are pi ∈ reg(ai) and ri ∈ reg(ci) such that
−→piqi =
λ · −→piri. Let these points be of the form pi = (p
1
i , ..., p
ni
i ), qi = (q
1
i , ..., q
ni
i ) and
ri = (r
1
i , ..., r
ni
i ). Now let q be a point from reg(b). Without lack of generality,
given the fact that the attribute domains are orthogonal, we can assume
that q is of the form (q11, ..., q
n1
1 , ..., q
1
l , ..., q
nl
l ). We can moreover construct
the points p = (p11, ..., p
n1
1 , ..., p
1
l , ..., p
nl
l ) and r = (r
1
1, ..., r
n1
1 , ..., r
1
l , ..., r
nl
l ). By
construction, we then have that p ∈ reg(a), r ∈ reg(c) and −→pq = λ · −→pr. As
we can do this for every q ∈ reg(b), we have shown (A.2).
The proof of (A.3) is entirely analogous.
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Proof of Proposition 7
The proof is entirely analogous to the proof of Propositions 2 and 5.
Proof of Proposition 8
From the definitions of fR and f̂R we immediately find that
f̂R(X) =
⋃
x∈X
f̂R({x}) ⊆
⋃
x∈X
fR({x}) = fR(X)
and thus f̂R ≤ fR. To show that f̂ ≤ f̂R we show by induction that f̂ ≤ f̂R
(i)
for all i ∈ N. The case where i = 0 was shown in Proposition 1. Assuming
that we have already established f̂ ≤ f̂R
(i)
, from the monotonicity of betσ
and parτ w.r.t. set inclusion we find that
f̂R
(i+1)
({x}) = fR({x}) ∩
⋂
σ⊆[0,1]
{betσ(f̂R
(i)
(Y ), f̂R
(i)
(Z))|x∈ betσ(Y, Z)}
∩
⋂
τ⊆[0,+∞[
{parτ (f̂R
(i)
(X), f̂R
(i)
(Y ), f̂R
(i)
(Z))|x∈ parτ (X, Y, Z)}
⊇ fR({x}) ∩
⋂
σ⊆[0,1]
{betσ(f̂(Y ), f̂(Z))|x∈ betσ(Y, Z)}
∩
⋂
τ⊆[0,+∞[
{parτ (f̂(X), f̂(Y ), f̂(Z))|x∈ parτ (X, Y, Z)}
⊇ f̂({x})
where the last step follows from f̂({x}) ⊆ fR({x}) (since f̂ ≤ fR by Proposi-
tion 1), together with (36) and (37). Finally note that f̂(X) =
⋃
x∈X f̂({x})
by definition of f̂ .
Proof of Lemma 1
Assume that α is strongly consistent, and let β be such that β |= α,
β is consistent, and all attribute domains in domains(β) are orthogonal.
As set(β) ⊆ set(α) we also have (set(β)↓i1)↓i2 ...↓is ⊆ (set(α)↓i1)↓i2 ...↓is for all
i1, ..., is. If the positions i1, ..., is refer to all attribute domains that are outside
domains(β), then clearly (set(β)↓i1)↓i2 ...↓is is non-empty and only contains
components referring to orthogonal attribute domains anymore. This means
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that also (set(α)↓i1)↓i2 ...↓is is non-empty and refers to orthogonal attribute
domains, which means that set(α) is realizable.
Conversely, assume that set(α) is realizable, then there exist positions
i1, ..., is such that (set(α)
↓i1)↓i2 ...↓is is non-empty and only refers to orthogonal
attribute domains. For b ∈ (set(α)↓i1)↓i2 ...↓is we then find that conj(b) |= α
while all attribute domains in domains(conj(b)) are orthogonal, which means
that α is strongly consistent.
Proof of Proposition 9
(⇒) Assume that Σ ⊢ α → β ⋊⋉σ γ can be derived from the inference rules
(bet1)–(bet9). We show by induction that set(α) ⊆ betσ(set(β), set(γ)).
If Σ ⊢ α → β ⋊⋉σ γ was obtained from (bet1), then α, β and γ are
atoms and we have that betσ(β, α, γ) ∈ Σ, from which we find us-
ing (39) that betσ(reg(β), reg(α), reg(γ)) holds which is the same as
betσ(set(β), set(α), set(γ)) because α, β and γ are atoms. We then
easily find that set(α) ⊆ betσ(set(β), set(γ)). Indeed, applying the
definition of betσ, given by (28), all attribute domains except for the
one in which α, β and γ occur are deemed irrelevant, in which case
betσ(set(β), set(γ)) reduces to betweenness at the atom level.
If Σ ⊢ α → β ⋊⋉σ γ was obtained from (bet2), then there exist α
′,
β′, γ′ and σ′ such that α |=A α
′, β′ |=A β and γ
′ |=A γ, Σ ⊢ α
′ →
β′ ⋊⋉σ′ γ
′, and σ′ ⊆ σ. By induction, we then have that set(α′) ⊆
betσ′(set(β
′), set(γ′)), while we have set(α) ⊆ set(α′), set(β′) ⊆ set(β)
and set(γ′) ⊆ set(γ). By the fact that bet is clearly monotonic w.r.t.
set inclusion, it follows that
set(α) ⊆ set(α′) ⊆ betσ′(set(β
′), set(γ′)) ⊆ betσ(set(β), set(γ))
In the case where Σ ⊢ α → β ⋊⋉σ γ was obtained from (bet3), we
already have set(α) ⊆ bet1−σ(set(γ), set(β)). From the symmetry of
the betweenness relation, we then immediately find that also set(α) ⊆
betσ(set(β), set(γ)).
In the case where Σ ⊢ α → β ⋊⋉σ γ was obtained from (bet4), the
strong consistency of β ensures that set(β) is realizable. By definition,
we then have set(α) ⊆ betσ(set(α), set(β)), given that 0 ∈ σ.
The case where Σ ⊢ α → β ⋊⋉σ γ was obtained from (bet5) directly
follows from the fact that we have set(α) ⊆ betα(set(α), set(α)) for any
α. Indeed, from (28) is follows that betσ(X1, X2) ⊇ X1 ∩X2.
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If Σ ⊢ α → β ⋊⋉σ γ was obtained from (bet6), then there exist α1,
α2, β1, β2, γ1 and γ2 such that α = α1 ∨ α2, β = β1 ∨ β2, γ = γ1 ∨
γ2 and, by induction, set(α1) ⊆ betσ(set(β1), set(γ1)) and set(α2) ⊆
betσ(set(β2), set(γ2)). Now, we have that
betσ(set(β), set(γ)) = betσ(set(β1 ∨ β2), set(γ1 ∨ γ2))
= betσ(set(β1) ∪ set(β2), set(γ1) ∪ set(γ2))
From the monotonicity of betσ w.r.t. set inclusion, we find that the latter
expression includes both betσ(set(β1), set(γ1)) and betσ(set(β2), set(γ2)),
and thus also betσ(set(β1), set(γ1))∪betσ(set(β2), set(γ2)), which in turn
includes set(α1) ∪ set(α2). By definition of set the latter expression is
equivalent to set(α1 ∨ α2) and thus to set(α).
If Σ ⊢ α → β ⋊⋉σ γ was obtained from (bet7), then there exist
α′, β′, γ′ and δ such that α = α′ ∧ δ, β = β′ ∧ δ, γ = γ′ ∧ δ
and, by induction, set(α′) ⊆ betσ(set(β
′), set(γ′)). If set(α) ⊆ set(β′)
or set(α) ⊆ set(γ′), the proof is trivial, so assume that this were
not the case. Since δ is strongly consistent, we can assume without
lack of generality that the attribute domains in domains(δ) are or-
thogonal to each other (since if this were not the case, we could re-
place δ with a logically equivalent formula for which this is the case).
Since the elements of domains(δ) are moreover orthogonal to the el-
ements of domains(β′) and domains(γ′), it is not hard to see that
betσ(set(β
′), set(γ′))∩ set(δ) ⊆ betσ(set(β
′)∩ set(δ), set(γ′)∩ set(δ)). In-
deed, this is trivial if β′ or γ′ is not strongly consistent. If both are
strongly consistent, then let b ∈ betσ(set(β
′), set(γ′)) ∩ set(δ) and let
b′ be the vector obtained from b after removing the components of
all irrelevant attribute domains. Then there are corresponding sub-
vectors a′ and c′ of elements in set(β′) and set(γ′) respectively, such
that betσ(a
′,b′, c′) holds. Now a′, b′ and c′ can be extended to vectors
a′′, b′′ and c′′ by adding the components from domains(δ), choosing
the same values as in b. Then it clearly holds that betσ(a
′′,b′′, c′′),
while any extension of a′′ and b′′ to full vectors a and b will be-
long to set(δ), leading to b ∈ betσ(set(β
′) ∩ set(δ), set(γ′) ∩ set(δ)).
Hence, we have set(α′) ∩ set(δ) ⊆ betσ(set(β
′) ∩ set(δ), set(γ′) ∩ set(δ)),
which is equivalent to set(α′ ∧ δ) ⊆ betσ(set(β
′ ∧ δ), set(γ′ ∧ δ)) and to
set(α) ⊆ betσ(set(β), set(γ)).
If Σ ⊢ α → β ⋊⋉ γ was obtained from (bet8), there are α1, α2,
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β1, β2, γ1 and γ2 such that α = α1 ∧ α2, β = β1 ∧ β2 and γ =
γ1 ∧ γ2, such that, by induction, set(α1) ⊆ bet[λ,λ](set(β1), set(γ1)) and
set(α2) ⊆ bet[λ,λ](set(β2), set(γ2)). Given the definition of bet[λ,λ] and
given the fact that the attribute domains in domains(β1)∪domains(γ1)
are orthogonal to those in domains(β2) ∪ domains(γ2), we can show
that bet[λ,λ](set(β1), set(γ1))∩bet[λ,λ](set(β2), set(γ2)) ⊆ bet[λ,λ](set(β1)∩
set(β2), set(γ1) ∩ set(γ2)). If λ = 0 or λ = 1 then this is trivial. If
λ ∈]0, 1[, from b ∈ bet[λ,λ](set(β1), set(γ1))∩ bet[λ,λ](set(β2), set(set(γ2)),
we find that there are two non-overlapping subvectors b1 and b2 of
b (containing components for the attribute domains in domains(β1) ∪
domains(γ1) and domains(β2)∪domains(γ2) respectively) and such that
bet[λ,λ](a1,b1, c1) and bet[λ,λ](a2,b2, c2) hold, for appropriate subvec-
tors of elements a and c from set(β1∧β2) and set(γ1∧γ2). By definition
of bet[λ,λ], we then get that bet[λ,λ](a12,b12, c12) holds for the compound
vectors, from which we find that b ∈ bet[λ,λ](set(β1) ∩ set(β2), set(γ1) ∩
set(γ2)). Thus we find that
set(α1) ∩ set(α2) ⊆ betσ(set(β1) ∩ set(β2), set(γ1) ∩ set(γ2))
which is equivalent to set(α1∧α2) ⊆ betσ(set(β1∧β2), set(γ1∧ γ2)) and
to set(α) ⊆ betσ(set(β), set(γ)).
The case where Σ ⊢ α→ β ⋊⋉γ was obtained from (bet9) is trivial.
(⇐) Now we assume that set(α) ⊆ betσ(set(β), set(γ)) and show that Σ ⊢
α → β ⋊⋉σ γ can be derived from the inference rules (bet1)–(bet9).
If α is inconsistent, then Σ ⊢ α → β ⋊⋉σ γ follows from (bet9) and
(bet2). Otherwise, given that (bet2) entails syntax-independence, we
can assume without lack of generality that α is of the form α1∨ ...∨αr,
where each αi is a conjunction containing exactly one atom from each
attribute domain. In other words, set(αi) = {a} is a singleton. Because
of inference rules (bet6) and (bet2), it suffices to show that Σ ⊢ αi →
β ⋊⋉σ γ can be derived for each i.
The fact that a ∈ betσ(set(β), set(γ)) either means that (i) a ∈ set(β)∪
set(γ), (ii) there is a b ∈ set(β) and c ∈ set(γ) such that betσ(b, a, c)
holds, or (iii) it holds that a↓j ∈ betσ(set(β)
↓j, set(γ)↓j) for some j,
where we write a↓j for the vector a without the jth component and
set(β)↓j and set(γ)↓j are defined as in (22).
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In the first case, if a ∈ set(β)\set(γ) this means that set(γ) is realizable
and 0 ∈ σ (by (28)), hence that γ is strongly consistent (by Lemma
1). This means that we can derive Σ ⊢ αi → αi ⋊⋉σ γ using (bet4).
Using (bet2), we can then also conclude Σ ⊢ αi → β ⋊⋉σ γ given
that a ∈ set(β). In the same way, if a ∈ set(γ) \ set(β), we derive
Σ ⊢ αi → γ ⋊⋉1−σ β, and using (bet3) also Σ ⊢ αi → β ⋊⋉σ γ. If
a ∈ set(β) ∩ set(γ), using (bet5) we derive Σ ⊢ αi → αi ⋊⋉σ αi from
which we derive Σ ⊢ αi → β ⋊⋉σ γ by (bet2).
In the second case, we clearly have that conj(b) |=A β and conj(c) |=A
γ, hence because of inference rule (bet2) it suffices to show that Σ ⊢
conj(a)→ conj(b)⋊⋉σ conj(c) can be derived. By definition, betσ(b, a, c)
means that all components correspond to orthogonal attribute domains.
First assume that σ is a non-degenerate interval. We then have that
either (i) a = b, (ii) a = c, or (iii) that a differs only in one com-
ponent from b and c, and that component in a is moreover between
the corresponding components in b and c. In the latter situation,
Σ ⊢ conj(a) → conj(b) ⋊⋉σ conj(c) can clearly be derived using infer-
ence rules (bet1) (given (43)) and (bet7), whereas when a = b, it
can be derived using (bet4), and when a = c it can be derived using
(bet4) and (bet3). Now assume that σ = [λ, λ] is a degenerate in-
terval. Then we have bet[λ,λ](bi, ai, ci) for every i, hence we can derive
Σ ⊢ conj(a) → conj(b) ⋊⋉σ conj(c) by repeatedly applying (bet1) and
then using (bet8).
In the third case, note that set(β)↓j and set(γ)↓j correspond to formulas
β∗ and γ∗ such that β∗ |=A β and γ
∗ |=A γ. Moreover, αi is of the
form conj(a↓j) ∧ x for some atom x, and in particular we have that
αi |=A conj(a
↓j). By induction, we can moreover assume that Σ ⊢
conj(a↓j) → β∗ ⋊⋉σ γ
∗ can be derived. Using (bet2) this means that
also Σ ⊢ αi → β ⋊⋉σ γ can be derived.
Proof of Proposition 10
(⇒) Assume that Σ ⊢ β ⋊⋉σ γ → α can be derived from the inference rules
(bet1)–(bet6). We show by induction that then betσ(set(β), set(γ)) ⊆
set(α).
If Σ ⊢ β ⋊⋉σ γ → α was obtained from (bet1), then it is not hard to see
from (40) that betσ(set(β), set(γ)) ⊆ set(α).
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If Σ ⊢ β ⋊⋉σ γ → α was obtained from (bet2), then there exist α
′,
β′, γ′ and σ′ such that α′ |=A α, β |=A β
′, γ |=A γ
′, σ ⊆ σ′ and Σ ⊢
β′ ⋊⋉σ′ γ
′ → α′. By induction, we then have that betσ′(set(β
′), set(γ′)) ⊆
set(α′), while set(α′) ⊆ set(α), set(β) ⊆ set(β′) and set(γ) ⊆ set(γ′).
By the fact that betσ is clearly monotonic w.r.t. set inclusion, it follows
that betσ(set(β), set(γ)) ⊆ set(α).
The case where Σ ⊢ β ⋊⋉σ γ → α was obtained from (bet3) immediately
follows from the definition of bet.
If Σ ⊢ β ⋊⋉σ γ → α was obtained from (bet4), then there exist
α1, α2, β1 and β2 such that α = α1 ∨ α2, β = β1 ∨ β2, and, by
induction, betσ(set(β1), set(γ)) ⊆ set(α1) and betσ(set(β2), set(γ)) ⊆
set(α2). We have that betσ(set(β), set(γ)) = betσ(set(β1 ∨β2), set(γ)) =
betσ(set(β1) ∪ set(β2), set(γ)). From the definition of betσ it easily
follows that the latter expression is equal to betσ(set(β1), set(γ)) ∪
betσ(set(β2), set(γ)). By the assumption, this latter expression is known
to be included in set(α1) ∨ set(α2), which is equal to set(α).
If Σ ⊢ β ⋊⋉σ γ → α was obtained from (bet5), then there exist α1, α2,
β1, β2, γ1 and γ2 such that α = α1∧α2, β = β1∧β2, γ = γ1∧γ2 and, by
induction, betσ(set(β1), set(γ1)) ⊆ set(α1) and betσ(set(β2), set(γ2)) ⊆
set(α2). Now we have that betσ(set(β1∧β2), set(γ1∧γ2)) = betσ(set(β1)∩
set(β2), set(γ1) ∩ set(γ2)) ⊆ betσ(set(β1), set(γ1)) ⊆ set(α1), using the
monotonicity of betσ w.r.t. set inclusion and using induction. For the
same reason we also find betσ(set(β1∧β2), set(γ1∧γ2)) ⊆ set(α2), which
allows us to conclude that betσ(set(β1 ∧ β2), set(γ1 ∧ γ2)) ⊆ set(α1) ∩
set(α2) = set(α1 ∧ α2).
The case where Σ ⊢ β ⋊⋉σ γ → α was obtained from (bet6) is trivial.
(⇐) Now we assume that betσ(set(β), set(γ)) ⊆ set(α) and show that Σ ⊢
β ⋊⋉σ γ → α can be derived from the inference rules (bet1)–(bet6).
First assume that β is inconsistent, then Σ ⊢ β ⋊⋉σ γ → α can be
derived using (bet6). If γ is inconsistent, then Σ ⊢ β ⋊⋉σ γ → α can be
derived using (bet3) and (bet6). If neither of β and γ is inconsistent
(which implies that α cannot be inconsistent either), given that (bet2)
entails syntax-independence, we can assume without lack of generality
that α = α1 ∨ ...∨αr, β = β1 ∨ ...∨ βs and γ = γ1 ∨ ...∨ γt, where each
αi, βi and γi is a conjunction containing exactly one atom from each
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attribute domain. In other words, set(αi) = {ai}, set(βi) = {bi} and
set(γi) = {ci} are singletons. By definition of betσ, we then have that
betσ(set(β), set(γ)) =
⋃
i,j betσ(bi, cj). In particular, we also find that
for every i and j there are k1, ..., kl such that betσ(bi, cj) ⊆ {ak1 , ..., akl}.
The latter inclusion means that every component of each of ak1 , ..., akl
is between the corresponding components of bi and cj, and furthermore
that there are no other such vectors. Using (bet1) (given (44)) and
(bet5) we can therefore derive that Σ ⊢ βi ⋊⋉γj → αk1 ∨ ... ∨ αkl , and
by (bet2) that Σ ⊢ βi ⋊⋉γj → α. As we can derive this for every i and
j, (bet4) finally allows us to derive Σ ⊢ β ⋊⋉γ → α.
Proof of Proposition 11
(⇒) Assume that Σ ⊢ δ → γ ⊲τ 〈α, β〉 can be derived from the infer-
ence rules (par
1
)–(par
12
). We show by induction that then set(δ) ⊆
parτ (set(α), set(β), set(γ)).
If Σ ⊢ δ → γ⊲τ〈α, β〉 was obtained from (par1), then α, β, γ and δ are
atoms and we have from (41) that parτ (α, β, γ; δ) holds, from which we
find set(δ) ⊆ parτ (set(α), set(β), set(γ)).
If Σ ⊢ δ → γ ⊲τ 〈α, β〉 was obtained from (par2), then there exist
α′, β′, γ′, δ′ and τ ′ such that α′ |=A α, β
′ |=A β, γ
′ |=A γ, δ |=A δ
′,
τ ′ ⊆ τ and Σ ⊢ δ′ → γ′ ⊲τ ′ 〈α
′, β′〉. By induction, we then have
that set(δ′) ⊆ parτ ′(set(α
′), set(β′), set(γ′)), while set(α′) ⊆ set(α),
set(β′) ⊆ set(β), set(γ′) ⊆ set(γ), and set(δ) ⊆ set(δ′). By the fact that
parτ is clearly monotonic w.r.t. set inclusion, it follows that set(δ) ⊆
parτ (set(α), set(β), set(γ)).
The case where Σ ⊢ δ → γ⊲τ 〈α, β〉 was obtained from (par3) follows
immediately from the definition of parτ , given that the strong consis-
tency of α implies that set(α) is realizable (by Lemma 1).
The case where Σ ⊢ δ → γ ⊲τ 〈α, β〉 was obtained from (par4) fol-
lows immediately from the fact that parτ (X1, X2, X3) ⊇ X1 ∩X2 ∩X3
according to (29).
The cases where Σ ⊢ δ → γ⊲τ〈α, β〉 was obtained from (par5), (par6),
(par
7
) and (par
8
) are entirely analogous.
If Σ ⊢ δ → γ⊲τ〈α, β〉 was obtained from (par9), then there exist α1, α2,
β1, β2, γ1, γ2, δ1 and δ2 such that α = α1∨α2, β = β1∨β2, γ = γ1∨γ2,
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δ = δ1 ∨ δ2 and, by induction, set(δ1) ⊆ parτ (set(α1), set(β1), set(γ1))
and set(δ2) ⊆ parτ (set(α2), set(β2), set(γ2)). We have
parτ (set(α), set(β), set(γ))
= parτ (set(α1) ∪ set(α2), set(β1) ∪ set(β2), set(γ1) ∪ set(γ2))
From the monotonicity of parτ it easily follows that
parτ (set(α1), set(β1), set(γ1))
⊆ parτ (set(α1) ∪ set(α2), set(β1) ∪ set(β2), set(γ1) ∪ set(γ2))
parτ (set(α2), set(β2), set(γ2))
⊆ parτ (set(α1) ∪ set(α2), set(β1) ∪ set(β2), set(γ1) ∪ set(γ2))
Hence, we obtain set(α1) ∪ set(α2) ⊆ parτ (set(α1) ∪ set(α2), set(β1) ∪
set(β2), set(γ1)∪ set(γ2)) which is equivalent to what we need to prove.
If Σ ⊢ δ → γ⊲τ〈α, β〉 was obtained from (par10), then there exist α
′, β′
and φ such that α = α′ ∧ φ and β = β′ ∧ φ and, by induction, set(δ) ⊆
parτ (set(α
′), set(β′), set(γ)). Without lack of generality, we can assume
that the elements from domains(φ) are all orthogonal to each other
(because φ was assumed to be strongly consistent), and that φ = φ1 ∨
...∨ φs is in disjunctive-normal form. Because of (par9), it is sufficient
to show that set(δ) ⊆ parτ (set(α ∧ δi), set(β ∧ δi), set(γ)) for each i.
Since these elements from domains(δ) are assumed to be orthogonal to
the elements of domains(α) ∪ domains(β) ∪ domains(γ) ∪ domains(δ),
however, the latter inclusion follows easily from the definition of parτ ,
given that we already know that set(δ) ⊆ parτ (set(α
′), set(β′), set(γ)).
The case where (par
11
) is entirely analogous to the case for (par
8
) in
the proof of Proposition 9.
The case where Σ ⊢ δ → γ ⊲τ 〈α, β〉 was obtained from (par12) is
trivial.
(⇐) Now we assume that set(δ) ⊆ parτ (set(α), set(β), set(γ)) and show that
Σ ⊢ δ → γ ⊲τ 〈α, β〉 can be derived from the inference rules (par1)–
(par
12
). If either of α, β or γ is inconsistent, then we must have
that set(δ) = ∅, i.e. that δ is inconsistent as well. This means that
Σ ⊢ δ → γ⊲τ 〈α, β〉 can be derived from (par12) and (par2).
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If α, β and γ are consistent, given that (par
2
) entails syntax-independence,
we can assume without lack of generality that δ is of the form δ1∨...∨δr,
where each δi is a conjunction containing exactly one atom from each
attribute domain. In other words, set(δi) = {d} is a singleton. Be-
cause of inference rules (par
9
) and (par
2
), it suffices to show that
Σ ⊢ δi → γ⊲τ 〈α, β〉 can be derived for each i.
The fact that d ∈ parτ (set(α), set(β), set(γ)) either means that (i)
d ∈ set(β) ∪ set(γ), (ii) there is an a ∈ set(α), b ∈ set(β) and
c ∈ set(γ) such that parτ (a,b, c;d) holds, (iii) it holds that d
↓j ∈
parτ (set(α)
↓j, set(β)↓j, set(γ)↓j) for some j, where we write d↓j for the
vector d without the jth component and set(α)↓j, set(β)↓j and set(γ)↓j
are defined as in (22), or (iv) it holds that d↓j ∈ parτ (set(α)
↓j, set(β)↓y, set(γ)↓y)
for some j and some y from the corresponding attribute domain.
In the first case, if moreover d ∈ set(β)∩ set(γ)∩ set(α), we can derive
Σ ⊢ δi → δi⊲τ〈δi, δi〉 using (par4), and subsequently also that Σ ⊢ δi →
γ⊲τ 〈α, β〉 using (par2). If d ∈ (set(β)∩ set(γ)) \ set(α), we know that
α is strongly consistent and 0 ∈ τ , which means that we can derive Σ ⊢
δi → δi⊲τ〈α, δi〉 using (par8) and thus Σ ⊢ δi → γ⊲τ〈α, β〉 using (par2).
The case where d ∈ (set(α) ∩ set(γ)) \ set(β) is entirely analogous
(using (par
7
) instead of (par
8
)). If d ∈ set(β) \ (set(α) ∪ set(γ)), we
know that α ∧ γ is strongly consistent and 1 ∈ τ , hence we can derive
Σ ⊢ δi → α ∧ γ⊲τ〈α ∧ γ, δi〉 using (par3) and again Σ ⊢ δi → γ⊲τ〈α, β〉
using (par
2
). If d ∈ set(γ)\(set(α)∪set(β)), we know that either α and
β are strongly consistent and 0 ∈ τ or that α∧β is strongly consistent,
hence we can either derive Σ ⊢ δi → δi⊲τ 〈α, β〉 using (par6), or we
can derive Σ ⊢ δi → δi⊲τ 〈α ∧ β, α ∧ β〉 using (par5). In both cases,
we then find Σ ⊢ δi → γ⊲τ 〈α, β〉 using (par2).
In the second case, we clearly have that conj(a) |=A α, conj(b) |=A β
and conj(c) |=A γ, hence because of inference rule (par2) it suffices to
show that Σ ⊢ conj(d) → conj(c)⊲τ 〈conj(a), conj(b)〉 can be derived.
From the definition of parτ , we know that all components correspond
to orthogonal attribute domains. Moreover, either
• a = c, b = d and 1 ∈ τ ,
• d = c and 0 ∈ τ ,
• a differs only in one component from b, c differs from d only in
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that same component, and the respective values aj, bj, cj, dj of the
component satisfy parτ (aj, bj, cj; dj),
• τ = [µ, µ] is a degenerate interval, and for each component j, it
holds that parτ (aj, bj, cj; dj).
In the situation where a = c and b = d, we can derive Σ ⊢ conj(d)→
conj(c)⊲τ 〈conj(a), conj(b)〉 using (par3). In the second situation, we
can use (par
6
). In the third situation, it is clear that Σ ⊢ conj(d) →
conj(c)⊲τ 〈conj(a), conj(b)〉 can be derived by first applying inference
rule (par
1
) (given (45)) and then applying inference rule (par
10
). In
the last situation, we can similarly derive Σ ⊢ conj(d) → conj(c)⊲τ
〈conj(a), conj(b)〉 using (par
11
) instead of (par
10
).
In the third case, note that set(α)↓j, set(β)↓j and set(γ)↓j correspond
to formulas α∗, β∗ and γ∗ such that α∗ |=A α, β
∗ |=A β and γ
∗ |=A
γ. Moreover, δi is of the form conj(d
↓j) ∧ x for some atom x, and
in particular we have that δi |=A conj(d
↓j). By induction, we can
moreover assume that Σ ⊢ conj(d↓j) → γ∗⊲τ 〈α
∗, β∗〉 can be derived.
Using (par
2
) this means that also Σ ⊢ δi → γ⊲τ 〈α, β〉 can be derived.
In the fourth case, we have that set(α)↓j, set(β)↓j and set(γ)↓j corre-
spond to formulas α∗, β∗ and γ∗ such that α∗ |=A α, β
∗ ∧ y |=A β and
γ∗ ∧ y |=A γ. Using (par10) (for ψ = ⊤ and φ = y) and (par2), we
again find that Σ ⊢ δi → γ⊲τ 〈α, β〉 can be derived.
Proof of Proposition 12
(⇒) Assume that Σ ⊢ γ⊲τ〈α, β〉 → δ can be derived from the inference rules
(par1)–(par9). We show by induction that then
parτ (set(α), set(β), set(γ)) ⊆ set(δ)
If Σ ⊢ γ⊲τ 〈α, β〉 → δ was obtained from (par1), then it is not hard
to see from (42) that set(δ) = {d | parτ (a,b, c;d), a ∈ set(α),b ∈
set(β), c ∈ set(γ)}, from which we immediately find
parτ (set(α), set(β), set(γ)) ⊆ set(δ)
If Σ ⊢ γ ⊲τ 〈α, β〉 → δ was obtained from (par2), then there ex-
ist α′, β′, γ′, δ′ and τ ′ such that α |=A α
′, β |=A β
′, γ |=A γ
′,
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δ′ |=A δ and τ
′ ⊆ τ , and Σ ⊢ γ′ ⊲τ ′ 〈α
′, β′〉 → δ′. By induction, we
then have that parτ ′(set(α
′), set(β′), set(γ′)) ⊆ set(δ′), while set(α) ⊆
set(α′), set(β) ⊆ set(β′), set(γ) ⊆ set(γ′) and set(δ′) ⊆ set(δ). By the
fact that parτ is clearly monotonic w.r.t. set inclusion, it follows that
parτ (set(α), set(β), set(γ)) ⊆ set(δ).
If Σ ⊢ γ⊲τ 〈α, β〉 → δ was obtained from (par3), then there exist α1,
α2, δ1 and δ2 such that α = α1 ∨ α2, δ = δ1 ∨ δ2 and, by induction,
parτ (set(α1), set(β), set(γ)) ⊆ set(δ1) and parτ (set(α2), set(β), set(γ)) ⊆
set(δ2). Now, we have that parτ (set(α), set(β), set(γ)) = parτ (set(α1)∪
set(α2), set(β), set(γ)). From the definition of parτ it easily follows that
the latter expression is equal to
parτ (set(α1), set(β), set(γ)) ∪ parτ (set(α2), set(β), set(γ))
By the assumption, this latter expression is known to be included in
set(δ1) ∨ set(δ2), which is equal to set(δ).
The cases where Σ ⊢ γ⊲τ〈α, β〉 → δ was obtained from (par4) or from
(par5) are entirely analgous.
If Σ ⊢ γ⊲τ〈α, β〉 → δ was obtained from (par6), then there exist α1, α2,
β1, β2, γ1, γ2, δ1 and δ2 such that α = α1∧α2, β = β1∧β2, γ = γ1∧γ2,
δ = δ1 ∧ δ2 and, by induction, parτ (set(α1), set(β1), set(γ1)) ⊆ set(δ1)
and parτ (set(α2), set(β2), set(γ2)) ⊆ set(δ2). Given the monotonicity of
par w.r.t. set inclusion, we have that
parτ (set(α1 ∧ α2), set(β1 ∧ β2), set(γ1 ∧ γ2)) ⊆ parτ (set(α1), set(β1), set(γ1))
⊆ set(δ1)
parτ (set(α1 ∧ α2), set(β1 ∧ β2), set(γ1 ∧ γ2)) ⊆ parτ (set(α2), set(β2), set(γ2))
⊆ set(δ2)
which leads to parτ (set(α), set(β), set(γ)) ⊆ set(δ).
The cases where Σ ⊢ γ⊲τ〈α, β〉 → δ was obtained from (par7), (par8)
or (par9) are trivial.
(⇐) Now we assume that parτ (set(α), set(β), set(γ)) ⊆ set(δ) and show that
Σ ⊢ γ ⊲τ 〈α, β〉 → δ can be derived from the inference rules (par1)–
(par9). If α, β or γ is inconsistent, Σ ⊢ γ⊲τ〈α, β〉 → δ can be inferred
immediately using (par7)–(par9) and (par2).
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If neither of α, β and γ is inconsistent, given that (par2) entails syntax-
independence, we can assume without lack of generality that α = α1 ∨
... ∨ αr, β = β1 ∨ ... ∨ βs, γ = γ1 ∨ ... ∨ γt, δ = δ1 ∨ ... ∨ δu where
each αi, βi, γi and δi is a conjunction containing exactly one atom from
each attribute domain. In other words, set(αi) = {ai}, set(βi) = {bi},
set(γi) = {ci} and set(δi) = {di} are singletons. By definition of parτ ,
we then have that parτ (set(α), set(β), set(γ)) =
⋃
i,j,l parτ (ai,bj, cl). In
particular, we also find that for every i, j and l there are k1, ..., kr such
that parτ (ai,bj, cl) ⊆ {dk1 , ...,dkr}. The latter inclusion means that
the respective components of ai, bj, cl on the one hand and dk1 , ...,dkr
on the other hand all define parallel directions, and in particular that
we can derive Σ ⊢ γl⊲τ 〈αi, βj〉 → δk1 ∨ ... ∨ δkr using inference rules
(par1) (considering that (46)) and (par6). As we can do this for all i, j
and l, (par3), (par4) and (par5) allow us to derive Σ ⊢ γ⊲τ〈α, β〉 → δ.
Proof of Proposition 13
Before we move to the actual proof, we introduce some notations. Recall
that for any formula α, set(α) was defined to be a subset of A. However,
if domains(α) ⊆ {B1, ..., Bs}, then the attribute domains in {C1, ..., Ck} \
{B1, ..., Bs} are redundant, as they are not constrained by α. Throughout
the proof, we will use the notation setB(α) to denote the restriction of the
vectors in set(α) to the components corresponding to attribute domains from
B, and similar for the notation setC(α). For a vector x ∈ A, we also write
xB and xC for its restriction to the attribute domains in {B1, ..., Bs} and in
{C1, ..., Ck} respectively. Moreover, it should be clear from the definition of
e.g. betσ that when domains(β1) ⊆ {B1, ..., Bs}, domains(β2) ⊆ {B1, ..., Bs},
and betσ(set(β1), set(β2)) then we also have betσ(setB(β1), setB(β2)), and sim-
ilar for betσ, parσ and parσ, and for situations where the attribute domains
are restricted to {C1, ..., Ck}.
(⇒) Assuming
(R,Σ) ⊢ β → γ (A.4)
we show that f̂R(setB(β)) ⊆ setC(γ) using structural induction. Note
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that the soundness part of the proposition follows from this, as
setB(
∨
(x1,...,xs)∈X
∧
i
xi) = X
setC(
∨
(y1,...,yk)∈Y
∧
i
yi) = Y
1. If the right-hand side of (A.4) has been obtained using (S), we
have R |=A β → γ which means that fR(setB(β)) ⊆ setC(γ)
by definition of fR. Using Proposition 8, we can then conclude
f̂R(setB(β)) ⊆ setC(γ).
2. Assume that the last inference rule that was applied to obtain
(A.4) was (I’). Then there are β1, β2, γ1 and γ2 such that (R,Σ) ⊢
β1 → γ1, (R,Σ) ⊢ β2 → γ2, Σ ⊢ β → β1 ⋊⋉σ β2 and Σ ⊢ β1 ⋊⋉σ
β2 → γ. By induction, we know that f̂R(setB(β1)) ⊆ setC(γ1) and
f̂R(setB(β2)) ⊆ setC(γ2). By construction of f̂R, this means that
f̂R(betσ(setB(β1), setB(β2))) ⊆ betσ(setC(γ1), setC(γ2)). Moreover,
by Propositions 9 and 10, we know from Σ ⊢ β → β1 ⋊⋉σ β2 and
Σ ⊢ β1 ⋊⋉σ β2 → γ that setB(β) ⊆ betσ(setB(β1), setB(β2)) and
betσ(setC(γ1), setC(γ2)) ⊆ setC(γ). Together with the monotonicity
of f̂R w.r.t. set inclusion, this leads to f̂R(setB(β)) ⊆ setC(γ).
3. The case where (E’) is the last inference rule that was applied is
entirely analogous.
4. Assume that the last inference rule that was applied to obtain
(A.4) was (D). Then there are formulas β1, β2, γ1, and γ2 such
that
(R,Σ) ⊢ β1 → γ1 (A.5)
(R,Σ) ⊢ β2 → γ2 (A.6)
{β1 → γ1, β2 → γ2} |=A β → γ (A.7)
Without lack of generality, we can assume that domains(β1) and
domains(β2) are subsets of {B1, ..., Bs}, while domains(γ1) and
domains(γ2) are subsets of {C1, ..., Ck}.
Let x ∈ setB(β). First suppose that x ∈ setB(β1) and x /∈ setB(β2).
By induction, we know that f̂R(x) ⊆ setC(γ1). From (A.7), we
moreover know that for every a in A such that aB = x and aC ∈
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setC(γ1), it holds that aC ∈ setC(γ). This means that fR(x) ∩
setC(γ1) ⊆ setC(γ). Together with f̂R(x) ⊆ setC(γ1), this means in
particular that f̂R(x) ⊆ setC(γ).
Entirely analogously, we find f̂R(x) ⊆ setC(γ) when x /∈ setB(β1)
and x ∈ setB(β2).
If x ∈ setB(β1) and x ∈ setB(β2), we find f̂R(x) ⊆ setC(γ1) ∩
setC(γ1). For every a in A such that aB = x, aC ∈ setC(γ1) and
aC ∈ setC(γ2), it then holds that aC ∈ setC(γ) due to (A.7). Again
this leads to f̂R(x) ⊆ setC(γ).
Finally, if x /∈ setB(β1) and x /∈ setB(β2), we find that any a ∈ A
satisfying aB = x is such that aC ∈ setC(γ). Thus again we have
f̂R(x) ⊆ setC(γ).
(⇐) We show by induction on n that whenever f̂R
(n)
(X) ⊆ Y , it holds that
(R,Σ) ⊢
( ∨
(x1,...,xs)∈X
∧
i
xi
)
→
( ∨
(y1,...,yk)∈Y
∧
i
yi
)
(A.8)
The base case is straightforward: if fR(X) ⊆ Y , then by construction
of fR, it holds that
R |=A
( ∨
(x1,...,xs)∈X
∧
i
xi
)
→
( ∨
(y1,...,yk)∈Y
∧
i
yi
)
and thus (A.8) by inference rule (S).
To show the induction step, because of inference rule (D), it suffices
to show that for each x = (x1, ..., xn) in X, it holds that
(R,Σ) ⊢
∧
i
xi →
( ∨
(y1,...,yk)∈Y
∧
i
yi
)
(A.9)
From f̂R
(n+1)
({x}) ⊆ Y , by definition of f̂R
(n+1)
we have that there
exist Y1, ..., Ym, Z1, ..., Zm, σ1, ..., σm, U1, ..., Ul, V1, ..., Vl,W1, ...,Wl and
τ1, ..., τl such that
Y ⊇fR({x}) ∩
⋂
i
betσi(f̂R
(n)
(Yi), f̂R
(n)
(Zi))
∩
⋂
i
parτi(f̂R
(n)
(Ui), f̂R
(n)
(Vi), f̂R
(n)
(Wi)) (A.10)
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and moreover x ∈ betσi(Yi, Zi) for each i ∈ {1, ...,m} and x ∈ parτi(Ui, Vi,Wi)
for each i ∈ {1, ..., l}.
By induction, we know that for each Yj, it holds that
(R,Σ) ⊢
( ∨
(y1,...,ys)∈Yj
∧
i
yi
)
→
( ∨
(a1,...,ak)∈ bf
(n)
R
(Yj)
∧
i
ai
)
and similar for Zj, Uj, Vj and Wj. Furthermore, from x ∈ bet(Yi, Zi)
we find using Proposition 9 that
Σ ⊢
∧
i
xi →
( ∨
(y1,...,ys)∈Yj
∧
i
yi
)
⋊⋉σi
( ∨
(z1,...,zs)∈Zj
∧
i
zi
)
Similarly, from x ∈ par(Uj, Vj,Wj), we find using Proposition 11 that
Σ ⊢
∧
i
xi →
( ∨
(u1,...,us)∈Uj
∧
i
ui
)
⊲τi 〈
( ∨
(v1,...,vs)∈Vj
∧
i
vi
)
,
( ∨
(w1,...,ws)∈Wj
∧
i
wi
)
〉
Using Proposition 10 and 12, we trivially derive
Σ ⊢
( ∨
(a1,...,ak)∈ bf
(n)
R
(Yj)
∧
ai
)
⋊⋉σi
( ∨
(b1,...,bk)∈ bf
(n)
R
(Zj)
∧
bi
)
→
( ∨
(a1,...,ak)∈betσj (
bf
(n)
R
(Yj), bf
(n)
R
(Zj))
∧
i
ai
)
Σ ⊢
( ∨
(a1,...,ak)∈ bf
(n)
R
(Uj)
∧
ai
)
⊲τj 〈
( ∨
(b1,...,bk)∈ bf
(n)
R
(Vj)
∧
bi
)
,
( ∨
(c1,...,ck)∈ bf
(n)
R
(Wj)
∧
ci
)
〉
→
( ∨
(a1,...,ak)∈projτj (
bf
(n)
R
(Uj), bf
(n)
R
(Vj), bf
(n)
R
(Wj))
∧
i
ai
)
Using inference rules (I’) and (E’), together this allows us to derive
(R,Σ) ⊢
∧
i
xi →
( ∨
(a1,...,ak)∈betσj (
bf
(n)
R
(Yj), bf
(n)
R
(Zj))
∧
i
ai
)
(A.11)
(R,Σ) ⊢
∧
i
xi →
( ∨
(a1,...,ak)∈parτj (
bf
(n)
R
(Uj), bf
(n)
R
(Vj), bf
(n)
R
(Wj))
∧
i
ai
)
(A.12)
89
Using inference rule (S), we find the trivial rule
(R,Σ) ⊢
∧
i
xi →
∨
(a1,...,ak)∈fR({x})
∧
i
ai (A.13)
By two repeated applications of (D) to combine (A.11), (A.12) and
(A.13), we find
(R,Σ) ⊢
∧
i
xi →
( ∨
(a1,...,ak)∈betσj (
bf
(n)
R
(Yj), bf
(n)
R
(Zj))
∧
i
ai
)
∧
( ∨
(a1,...,ak)∈parτj (
bf
(n)
R
(Uj), bf
(n)
R
(Vj), bf
(n)
R
(Wj))
∧
i
ai
)
∧
∨
(a1,...,ak)∈fR({x})
∧
i
ai
Finally, from (A.10), it follows that we can apply (D) one more time
to weaken the latter rule, from which we obtain (A.9).
Proof of Proposition 14
The rule base R initially contains two types of rules. On the one hand,
there is (84), whose antecedent corresponds to the outcome J , while on the
other hand, there are rules of the form (82) and (83), whose antecedent does
not correspond to any outcome at all. Clearly, non-trivial new rules can
only be obtained from R by using interpolative reasoning. More specifically,
initially, we can only combine the rule (84) with one of the other rules to
yield a new rule r1, whose consequent is of the form y1 ∨ y2 and whose
antecedent only differs from the antecedent of (84) in that an atom of the
form xi has been replaced by xi, or an atom of the form xi has been replaced
by xi. Moreover, this application of interpolation can only be applied if the
antecedents of both (84) and r1 satisfy the proposition p. Thus it is clear
that the antecedent of r1 corresponds to an outcome J1 such that there is an
improving flip from J to J1. We can then combine r1 with some rule of the
form (82) or(83) to obtain a new rule r2 whose antecedent corresponds to
an outcome J2 such that there is an improving flip from J1 to J2. It is thus
clear that a rule of the form (85) can only be derived if there is a sequence
of outcomes J, J1, ..., Jm, I that corresponds to a sequence of improving flips,
i.e. if I dominates J . Conversely, it is also clear that if there is an improving
flip from Ji to Ji+1, we will be able to derive the corresponding rule ri+1 once
ri has been derived.
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Proof of Proposition 15
The proof is entirely analogous to the proof of Proposition 14.
Proof of Proposition 16
By construction, it is clear that
f̂R
(i+1)
({x}) ⊆f̂R
(i)
({x})
∩
⋂
{betσ(f̂R
(i)
(set(α)), f̂R
(i)
(set(γ))) | c1 ∨ c2}
∩
⋂
{parτ (f̂R
(i)
(set(α)), f̂R
(i)
(set(β)), f̂R
(i)
(set(γ))) | c3 ∨ c4}
To show that the inclusion also holds in the other direction, let Y and Z be
subsets of B such that x ∈ betσ(Y, Z). We show that there are formulas α
and γ such that condition c1 or c2 is satisfied and
f̂R
(i)
({x}) ∩ betσ(f̂R
(i)
(set(α)), f̂R
(i)
(set(γ))) ⊆ betσ(f̂R
(i)
(Y ), f̂R
(i)
(Z))
(A.14)
First assume that all attribute domains are orthogonal. If x ∈ Y and 0 ∈ σ,
then we will have
f̂R
(i)
({x}) ⊆ betσ(f̂R
(i)
({x}), f̂R
(i)
(Z)) ⊆ betσ(f̂R
(i)
(Y ), f̂R
(i)
(Z))
and (A.14) is satisfied (regardless of the choice of α and γ). Similarly, we
find that (A.14) is satisfied if x ∈ Z and 1 ∈ σ. If x ∈ Y ∩Z, we find for any
(non-empty) σ that
f̂R
(i)
({x}) ⊆ betσ(f̂R
(i)
({x}), f̂R
(i)
({x})) ⊆ betσ(f̂R
(i)
(Y ), f̂R
(i)
(Z))
and therefore again (A.14). If there are y ∈ Y and z ∈ Z such that
betσ(y,x, z), then either we have y = x and 0 ∈ σ or y = z and 1 ∈ σ
or x = y = z, which are already covered, or we have that c1 or c2 is satisfied
for α = conj(y) and γ = conj(z). In the latter two cases we have
betσ(f̂R
(i)
(set(α)), f̂R
(i)
(set(γ))) ⊆ betσ(f̂R
(i)
(Y ), f̂R
(i)
(Z))
and thus also (A.14).
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Now assume that some attribute domains are not orthogonal, but that
conj(x) = xj ∧ conj(x
′) with x′ ∈ betσ(Y
↓j, Z↓j). If x′ ∈ Y ↓j, 0 ∈ σ and the
remaining attribute domains are orthogonal, we have
f̂R
(i)
({x}) ⊆ f̂R
(i)
(set(conj(x′)))
⊆ betσ(f̂R
(i)
(set(conj(x′))), f̂R
(i)
(Z))
⊆ betσ(f̂R
(i)
(Y ), f̂R
(i)
(Z))
The case where x′ ∈ Z↓j and 1 ∈ σ is entirely analogous. If the remaining
attribute domains are orthogonal and there are y′ ∈ Y ↓j and z′ ∈ Z↓j such
that betσ(y
′,x′, z′), we can take α = conj(y′) and γ = conj(z′). The case
where conj(x′) = xl ∧ conj(x
′′) with x′′ ∈ betσ(Y
↓j↓l, Z↓j↓l) is handled by
repeating the same argument.
In entirely the same way, we show that for subsets X, Y and Z of B such
that x ∈ parτ (X, Y, Z), there exist conjunctions α, β and γ such that c3 or
c4 is satisfied and
f̂R
(i)
({x}) ∩ parτ (f̂R
(i)
(set(α)), f̂R
(i)
(set(β)), f̂R
(i)
(set(γ)))
⊆ parτ (f̂R
(i)
(X), f̂R
(i)
(Y ), f̂R
(i)
(Z))
which completes the proof.
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